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BROTHER, CAN YOU SPARE A DOLLAR?
DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE FRAMEWORK
FOR FOREIGN CURRENCY LIQUIDITY
ASSISTANCE
Dan Awrey*
The core principles of financial crisis management call
upon central banks to lend freely, against good quality collat-
eral, and at a penalty rate of interest, to solvent but illiquid
banks and other financial institutions during periods of wide-
spread panic and instability. While often taken for granted,
these principles were designed for a world in which central
banks have the capacity to create money denominated in the
same currency as the one in which domestic banks and other
financial institutions issue deposits and other short-term lia-
bilities.
Unfortunately, this is not the world in which we live. The
application of these principles is far from straightforward in a
world where financial institutions rely on short-term foreign
currency liabilities as a source of financing. This is the world
of the Eurodollar market. The global financial crisis vividly
illustrated the potential systemic risks arising from the exist-
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ence of a large Eurodollar market. Faced with a systemic for-
eign currency liquidity crisis, central banks struggled to secure
access to the foreign currency reserves needed to provide emer-
gency liquidity assistance to their domestic banking systems.
In response, the U.S. Federal Reserve and other major central
banks established a network of swap lines designed to provide
foreign currency liquidity assistance to the international finan-
cial system.
The central bank swap lines have been hailed as one of the
most important and effective policy responses to the financial
crisis. However, while it may be tempting to view them as an
effective prophylactic against future foreign currency liquidity
crises, the current structure of the swap lines fails to establish
truly credible international commitments or constrain the
moral hazard problems stemming from this ambitious state7
sponsored liquidity insurance. This Article examines the
unique policy challenges posed by foreign currency liquidity
problems, along with how to build a more effective framework
for the provision of foreign currency liquidity assistance.
I. Introduction ........................ ........ 936
II. The Origins, Mechanics, and Growth of the Eurodollar
Market ..................................... 948
III. Financial Crisis Management and the Problem of FCLA
.................................... ..... 955
A. The Fundamentals of Emergency Liquidity
Assistance ................................. 956
B. The Problem of FCLA ............... ...... 968
IV. The Eurodollar Market and the Financial Crisis..... 972
V. Designing an Effective Framework for FCLA..........985
A. A Blanket Prohibition Against Eurodollar
Liabilities ......................... ...... 986
B. A Global Currency and Central Bank ................ 991
C. Reform of Existing Institutional Arrangements for
FCLA.................................. 997
VI. Conclusion ........................... ..... 1015
935
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
The massive public-sector support for banks and other fi-
nancial institutions at the height of the global financial crisis
has understandably attracted a maelstrom of controversy.
One of the most controversial-and yet surprisingly under-
scrutinized-aspects of this support was its extension to fi-
nancial institutions incorporated and licensed to carry on
business in other countries.1 In the United States, eighteen of
the twenty-five largest borrowers under the emergency Term
Auction Facility ("TAF") established in December 2007 were
European banks. 2 Foreign banks also ultimately received bil-
lions of dollars under Maiden Lane II and III, the vehicles that
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York used to provide sup-
port to global insurance giant American International Group
("AIG").3 And perhaps most strikingly, the Federal Reserve
(or, the "Fed") extended over $USD500 billion at its peak to
1 See, e.g., Alan Grayson, Alan Grayson: "Which Foreigners Got the
Fed's $500,000,000,000?" Bernanke: "I Don't Know.", YOUTUBE (July 21,
2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-nONYBTkElyQ (showing then
Rep. Alan Grayson of Florida questioning then Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Ben Bernanke before the House Financial Services Committee
on the identity of the foreign financial institutions that received this sup-
port). This controversy continued to rage on well after the acute phase of
the crisis. See, e.g., Gerald P. O'Driscoll Jr., The Federal Reserve's Covert
Bailout of Europe, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424052970204464404577118682763082876.
2 Efraim Benmelech, An Empirical Analysis of the Fed's Term Auction
Facility, 2 CATO PAPERS ON PUB. POL'Y 57, 78-79 (2012). In total, foreign
banks received 58% of the total amount of money lent through TAF. Id. at
75. For details of borrowing under TAF, see Term Auction Facility (TAF),
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/newsevents/reform taf.htm [perma.cc/6PJR-43F2].
3 See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RES-
CUE, ITS IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT'S EXIT STRATEGY 87-94
(2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT56698/pdf/CPRT-
111JPRT56698.pdf [perma.cc/AC7G-4EKR].
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foreign banks and other financial institutions under the aus-
pices of temporary swap lines established with other major
central banks.4
This extraordinary public support for foreign banks and
other financial institutions is often defended as having been
necessitated by the high level of integration and interconnect-
edness within the global financial system. When the United
States, Europe, or other major financial centers get a sniffle,
the rest of the world stands at risk of catching a cold.5 One of
the primary drivers of this integration and interconnected-
ness stems from the dominant role of the U.S. dollar in inter-
national trade, finance, and investment. 6 At the heart of this
role is an incredibly important yet relatively obscure corner of
the financial system known as the "Eurodollar" market.
We tend to think of money as something over which states
enjoy absolute sovereignty.7 This thinking reflects the critical
4 See infra Part IV and Part V for further details regarding the opera-
tion of these central bank swap lines and how they were employed during
the financial crisis.
5 Indeed, this is how the Federal Reserve itself has framed this ra-
tionale in various public statements, including a video designed to explain
why the central bank swap lines are in the national interest of the United
States. See Protecting the U.S. Economy from Strains Abroad-Why Swap
Lines Are in the U.S. National Interest, FED. RES. BANKN.Y. (Sept. 19,2017),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/education/liqswap.html.
6 For a good and highly readable description of this role, see generally
BARRY EICHENGREEN, EXORBITANT PRIVILEGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
DOLLAR AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (2011).
7 Indeed, while reasonable scholars can and do disagree about its fun-
damental nature and importance, there has historically been a remarkable
degree of convergence around the view that the locus of monetary sover-
eignty is the state. See Benjamin J. Cohen, The International Monetary Sys-
tem: Diffusion and Ambiguity, 84 INT'L AFFAIRS 455, 464 (2008) ("Tradition
has long assigned the primary role in monetary governance to the sovereign
state."). This state-centric view has a long and distinguished pedigree in
Western political thought. Thomas Hobbes, John Stuart Mill, and Adam
Smith each acknowledged the central role of the state in monetary affairs.
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 189 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier Books
1962) (1651) (". . . money, of what matter soever coined by the sovereign of
a commonwealth, is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else, be-
tween the subjects of that commonwealth. By the means of which measure,
all commodities, movable and immovable, are made to accompany a man to
937
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role that states play in establishing and maintaining the core
legal and economic institutions around which modern mone-
tary systems are built.8 States define which instruments qual-
ify as "legal tender", prescribe what means of payment can be
used to pay taxes, and oversee the process of minting coins
all places of his resort, within and without the place of his ordinary resi-
dence; and the same passeth from man to man, within the commonwealth;
and goes round about, nourishing, as it passeth, every part thereof; in so
much as this concoction, is as it were the sanguification of the common-
wealth: for natural blood is in like manner made of the fruits of the earth;
and circulating, nourisheth by the way every member of the body of man.");
JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR
APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 151 (1848) ("So much of barbarism ...
still remains in the transactions of the most civilized nations, that almost
all independent countries choose to assert their nationality by having, to
their own inconvenience and that of their neighbours, a peculiar currency
of their own."); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 410-11 (Thomas Dobson 1796) (1776) ("A prince,
who should enact that a certain proportion of his taxes should be paid in a
paper money of a certain kind, might thereby give a certain value to this
paper money."). Benjamin Franklin, meanwhile, viewed the ability of a state
to issue its own money as a prerequisite of sovereignty. See Pavlina R. Tcher-
neva, Money, Power, and Monetary Regimes 13 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard
Coll., Working Paper No. 861, 2016) (citing Karl Rhodes, The Counterfeiting
Weapon, 16 REGION Focus 34, 34-35 (2012). For some insight into Frank-
lin's views on the importance of money to the economic prosperity of the
American colonies, see The Nature and Necessity of a Paper-Currency, 3
April 1729, NAT'L ARCHIVES (last updated June 29, 2017), http://founders.ar-
chives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-01-02-0041 [perma.cc/GTT8-3Y2C]. For
more recent treatises reflecting this state-centric view, see ROSA MARtA
LASTRA, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AND MONETARY LAW 3-4 (2d ed. 2015);
CHARLES PROCTOR, MANN ON THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 500-01 (6th ed.
2005).
8 This view is often described as the "chartalist" theory of money. See 1
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY: THE PURE THEORY OF MONEY
4-7 (reprinted 1953) (1930); GEORG FRIEDRICH KNAPP, THE STATE THEORY OF
MONEY 31-32 (reprinted 1973) (1924); Abba P. Lerner, Money as a Creature
of the State, 37 AM. ECON. REV. 312 (1947). For a detailed historical study of
the role of the state in the development of money and monetary institutions
in the United Kingdom, see CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY (2014). The
"chartalist" view of money is often contrasted with the more market-ori-
ented or "metallist" view. See Charles A.E. Goodhart, The Two Concepts of
Money: Implications for the Analysis of Optimal Currency Areas, 14 EUR. J.
POL. ECON. 407 (1998).
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and printing paper currency. States also establish central
banks such as the Federal Reserve and endow them with the
power and responsibility to manage the money supply in pur-
suit of price stability, full employment, and other policy objec-
tives.9 Viewed solely from this perspective, states appear to
exercise almost complete control over the legal, fiscal, and
even physical machinery necessary to create money and en-
sure its widespread use amongst its citizenry. This state-cen-
9 The monetary policy objectives of the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee, for example,
are to "maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates
commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase production,
so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates." Federal Reserve. Act, 12
U.S.C. § 225a (2000). See also LASTRA, supra note 7, at 55-63, for a useful
introduction to the different objectives central banks pursue.
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tric view has long been recognized in common law jurispru-
dence' 0 and as a matter of public international law.11 It is also
deeply embedded in the everyday language of money: when
we talk about money, we talk about the U.S. dollar, British
pound, and Icelandic kr6na.12
10 As the English Privy Council observed as far back as 1605, money
"inheres in the bones of princes." DESAN, supra note 8, at 170 (citing The
Case of Mixed Money (1605), 118 ("Monetandi jus principum ossibus in-
haeret, Jus monetae comprehenditur in regalibus, quae nunquam a region
sceptro abdicantur.")). Over the centuries, the concept of monetary sover-
eignty has evolved in response to fundamental changes in the political land-
scape and the corresponding shift in the identity of the sovereign from ab-
solute monarchs to democratically elected governments. See BENN STEIL &
MANUEL HINDS, MONEY, MARKETS, AND SOVEREIGNTY 240 (2009) ("The trans-
formation of the concept of sovereignty reflects the evolution over centuries
of the dominant system of government from monarchy to democracy, with
the mythology of the king as the embodiment of the popular will being sub-
stituted for by the elected executive or legislature."); Claus D. Zimmerman,
The Concept of Monetary Sovereignty Revisited, 24 EuR. J. INT'L L. 797, 808
(2008) ("At the time when the concept of monetary sovereignty first ap-
peared, in order to support the exercise of the royal prerogative to coin
money as exercised by absolutist monarchs, the locus of both sovereignty
and the power to exercise it might still have been identical, but times have
obviously changed. The contemporary mainstream view of states being in-
struments at the service of their peoples as true holders of sovereignty may
be regarded as a corollary of the fundamental idea of popular sovereignty or
sovereignty of the people.") (footnote omitted). Yet despite these profound
changes, the concept has retained its state-centric orientation and remains
deeply rooted in the "one state, one currency" model that is observed in most
of the world today. For a comprehensive overview of this jurisprudence, see
PROCTOR, supra note 7, at chs. 3-8, 13 (describing, inter alia, the private
law of monetary obligations, related conflicts of law issues, and the lex mon-
etae principle).
11 For a general overview, see PROCTOR, supra note 7, at chs. 19-23 (de-
scribing various aspects of public international law in relation to money).
The recognition in public international law of a state's sovereignty over its
monetary affairs dates at least as far back as a 1929 decision of the Perma-
nent International Court of Justice. Payment of Various Serbian Loans Is-
sued in France (Fr. v. Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), Judg-
ment, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20, at 25 (July 12, 1929) ("It is indeed a
generally accepted principle that a State is entitled to regulate its own cur-
rency.").
12 The euro and, more recently, crypto-currencies, such as bitcoin, are
obvious exceptions. While this Article generally uses the terms "country" or
940 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REV7EW [Vol. 2017
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While often far less appreciated, states also play an im-
portant role in licensing private money creation.1 3 States au-
thorize the establishment of deposit-taking banks and pro-
hibit all firms other than banks from issuing deposit
liabilities.14 States then subject banks to portfolio restrictions,
capital and liquidity requirements, and other forms of pruden-
tial regulation and intensive prudential supervision.1 5 States
also provide banks with various forms of support not generally
available to other commercial enterprises. This support in-
cludes deposit guarantee schemes, emergency liquidity assis-
"state" to describe the political units that issue currencies, these terms
should be interpreted as encompassing, mutatis mutandis, political units
such as the Euro Area that issue "supranational" currencies.
13 See generally Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance
Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143 (2017) (describing the modern finan-
cial system as a public-private partnership characterized by the public ac-
commodation and monetization of private liabilities).
14 The unique privilege bestowed upon banks to issue deposit liabilities
is reflected in the legal definition of a "bank" in most jurisdictions. In the
European Union, for example, a "credit institution [bank] means an under-
taking the business of which is to take deposits or other payable funds from
the public and to grant credits for its own account . . ." (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on Prudential Re-
quirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, art. 4.1(1), 2013 O.J. (L 176) 18. There are
several definitions of a "bank" under U.S. law. For example, a bank is de-
fined as "an institution organized under the laws of the United States ...
which both-(i) accepts demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may
withdraw by check or similar means for payment to third parties or others;
and (ii) is engaged in the business of making commercial loans." U.S. Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(2)(c)(1) (2012) .(emphasis
added). Section 3(a)(2)(A) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, in contrast,
defines a state bank as "engaged in the business of receiving deposits, other
than trust funds" without a corresponding requirement that they also be
engaged in the business of making commercial loans. 12 U.S.C. §
1813(a)(2)(A) (2012). These definitions are typically accompanied by entry
restrictions prohibiting all firms other than banks from issuing deposit lia-
bilities. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(2) (2012).
15 For a more detailed description of this prudential regulation and su-
pervision, see JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION
chs. 14, 15, 26 (2016).
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tance or "lender of last resort" facilities, and special bank-
ruptcy or "resolution" regimes for failing banks. 16 Collectively,
this support enhances the credibility of a bank's commitment
to honor its deposit and other short-term liabilities. This cred-
ibility is further enhanced by the willingness of the state to
accept deposit liabilities in satisfaction of tax and other obli-
gations. The role of the state in licensing, regulating, and sup-
porting banks thus serves to entrench deposit liabilities as
close substitutes for coins, paper currency, and other forms of
state money. Once again, it is the state-this time in its ca-
pacity as the guardian of the conventional banking system-
that exercises control over the machinery of money creation.
If only it were so simple. Recent decades have witnessed
the gradual erosion of the privileged and mutually beneficial
relationship between the state, banks, and private money cre-
ation. In retail banking, money market mutual funds have
emerged as a substitute for conventional deposit and checking
accounts. 17 In commercial and wholesale banking, money
market funds, short-term commercial paper, and repurchase
(or "repo") agreements have grown to rival the more tradi-
tional savings products offered by banks. 18 Equally important,
although again often far less appreciated, banks and other fi-
nancial institutions incorporated and licensed in one country
have increasingly adopted the practice of issuing deposits and
other short-term liabilities denominated in the currency of an-
other country. Banks in London offer U.S. dollar deposit ac-
16 For an in-depth look at this support, see id. at chs. 15, 16. For a dis-
cussion of how such support enhances the credibility of the commitments
underpinning these liabilities, see Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Inside
Safe Assets, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 363 (2016).
17 For a good summary of the emergence of money market mutual
funds as substitutes for bank deposits, see Jonathan Macey, Reducing Sys-
temic Risk: The Role of Money Market Mutual Funds as Substitutes for Fed-
erally Insured Bank Deposits, 17 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 131 (2011).
1s For a description of how and why commercial paper and repurchase
agreements serve as substitutes for more traditional banking products, see
ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 15, ch. 21. For a description of how money market
mutual funds serve as substitutes for bank deposits, see Macey, supra note
17.
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counts; investment banks in Shanghai provide euro denomi-
nated trade financing. The unfettered ability of financial in-
stitutions to create these short-term foreign currency liabili-
ties with little more than the stroke of a bookkeeper's pen-or
a few keys-effectively severs the cord between states and
money creation. This is the world of the Eurodollar market.
The Eurodollar market has been around for a very long
time. Writing in 1873, the English essayist and father of mod-
ern central banking, Walter Bagehot, described the predeces-
sor to the modern Eurodollar market as an important compo-
nent of London's money market. 19 Yet it is only in the past
twenty years or so that this market has blossomed into a
multi-trillion dollar behemoth, the health and stability of
which has a significant impact on global economic activity and
financial stability. The best-known Eurodollar market is the
market for U.S. dollar denominated deposits held with foreign
banks in countries like the United Kingdom. However, there
are also significant Eurodollar markets for commercial paper,
repo agreements, derivatives, and trade financing across a
range of different countries and currencies. 20
The most striking feature of the Eurodollar market is that
it revolves around the issuance of short-term liabilities by fi-
nancial institutions that are not licensed or subject to pruden-
tial regulatory oversight in the country that issues the cur-
rency in which these liabilities are denominated. Most
importantly for the present purposes, these institutions do not
enjoy access to the emergency liquidity assistance ("ELA") fa-
cilities provided by the central bank in the country that issues
19 See WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE
MONEY MIARKET 33 (reprinted 1999) (1873) ("Now that London is the clear-
ing-house to foreign countries, London has a new liability to foreign coun-
tries. At whatever place many people have to make payments, at that place
those people must keep money. A large deposit of foreign money in London
is now necessary for the business of the world."). This nascent Eurodollar
market differed from its modern counterpart in one very important respect:
instead of national currencies such as the pound or dollar, it was gold bul-
lion that served as the de facto international reserve currency. Id. at 44.
20 See infra Part II for further details of the origins, basic mechanics,
and recent growth of these markets.
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the relevant currency. These ELA facilities are an essential
tool of financial crisis management: providing collateralized
loans to solvent but illiquid banks and other financial institu-
tions in the event that private sources of financing become un-
available. 2 1 These facilities are thus often and understanda-
bly viewed as the last line of defense against financial panic
and instability before states are forced to resort to emergency
bailouts. While financial institutions issuing Eurodollar lia-
bilities may have access to the ELA facilities provided by the
central bank in their home country, there is no guarantee that
this central bank will hold or have access to sufficient reserves
of the required foreign currency. 22 This leaves these financial
institutions heavily reliant on private markets as a source of
foreign currency financing. When these markets break down,
these institutions run the risk of finding themselves without
a port in the middle of a dangerous storm.
This fault line in the global monetary, regulatory, and cri-
sis management architecture leaves the financial institutions
that issue Eurodollar liabilities particularly vulnerable to li-
quidity shocks of the variety experienced during the global fi-
nancial crisis. Indeed, one of the most pernicious episodes of
the financial crisis was the international U.S. dollar liquidity
shortage that began in December 2007 and reached its apex
in the autumn of 2008.23 This shortage forced banks and other
financial institutions that relied on Eurodollar markets as a
21 See infra Section III.A for further information regarding the func-
tions and institutional characteristics of these ELA facilities. See also
Thomas M. Humphrey, Lender of Last Resort: The Concept in History, FED.
REs. BANK RICHMOND EcoN. REV., Mar./Apr. 1989, at 8, 8. For a brief history
of the development of these facilities, see LASTRA, supra note 7, at 150-60;
Mark A. Carlson & David C. Wheelock, The Lender of Last Resort: Lessons
from the Fed's First 100 Years (Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper
No. 2012-056B, 2013).
22 Indeed, as described infra Section III.B, central banks may incur sig-
nificant costs in holding these foreign currency reserves. They may also be
unable to acquire sufficient quantities of foreign currency on the open mar-
ket during periods of widespread market disruption.
23 See infra Part IV for a more detailed description of the U.S. dollar
liquidity shortage during the financial crisis.
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source of financing to either cut back on their U.S. dollar lend-
ing activities or sell dollar denominated assets. The shortage
thus contributed to the broader contraction of lending and fire
sale dynamics that fanned the flames of the crisis.24 Ulti-
mately, it was the desire to extinguish these flames that mo-
tivated the Federal Reserve and other central banks to pro-
vide such extraordinary support to foreign financial
institutions.
This Article examines the two deeply intertwined policy
challenges arising from the widespread issuance of Eurodollar
liabilities by banks and other financial institutions. The first
challenge stems from the prospect of destabilizing cross-bor-
der capital flows as foreign currency liquidity is withdrawn
from the international financial system during periods of
widespread financial instability. The second challenge stems
from the significant practical constraints on the ability of cen-
tral banks to respond to this withdrawal of liquidity by provid-
ing financial institutions with ELA denominated in the re-
quired foreign currency.25 As this Article will show, these
24 For a more detailed description of these fire sale dynamics and how
they played out during the financial crisis, see Markus K. Brunnermeier,
Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, 23 J. ECON. PER-
SPECTIVES 77 (2009).
25 While not widely acknowledged or studied in the academic literature,
at least four scholars have previously identified aspects of this problem. See
LASTRA, supra note 7, at 25 ("The growth in Eurocurrency markets entails
a partial loss of monetary sovereignty.") (footnote omitted); Tullio Treves,
Monetary Sovereignty Today, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW: ISSUES FOR
THE NEW MILLENNIUM 117 (Mario Giovanoli ed., 2000) ("The lack of the state
of the currency's coercive power [over Eurodollar markets] . . . means that
such a state does not have the power effectively to regulate credit in its cur-
rency .... ); Milton Friedman, The Euro-Dollar Market: Some First Princi-
ples, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis R., July 1971, at 16, 17 ("The location of
the banks [that issue Eurodollar liabilities] is important primarily because
it affects the regulations under which the banks operate and hence the way
that they can do business."); Edward J. Frydl, The Eurodollar Conundrum,
FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. Q. REV., Spring 1982, at 11 (". . . the Euromarket
could in the future become an important snag in monetary control . . .").
However, as this Article will show, even these prescient scholars failed to
foresee the challenges posed by a large Eurodollar market in terms of effec-
tive financial crisis management.
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challenges generate enormous risks for the financial institu-
tions that issue Eurodollar liabilities, for the countries in
which these institutions are incorporated and licensed and
carry on business, and, ultimately, for global financial stabil-
ity.
Having framed these important challenges, this Article
goes on to examine a range of policy alternatives that might
be used to address them. At one end of the spectrum is a blan-
ket prohibition against banks and other financial institutions
issuing short-term foreign currency liabilities. At the other
end of the spectrum is the creation of a global currency and
central bank. In between these extremes reside a number of
important but largely incremental reforms to the emerging in-
stitutional architecture for the provision of foreign currency
liquidity assistance ("FCLA'). This architecture includes the
central bank swap lines used to provide U.S. dollar liquidity
to foreign banks in the thick of the financial crisis, along with
the new and still untested emergency lending facilities re-
cently introduced by the International Monetary Fund (the
"IMF"). In the case of the central bank swap lines, these re-
forms include the introduction of more observable and objec-
tive conditions for the provision of FCLA: ex ante qualifica-
tions for eligible countries, regulatory constraints for eligible
financial institutions, and a fee structure that better reflects
the role of this liquidity assistance as a form of insurance. In
the case of the IMF's new emergency lending facilities, these
reforms include a significant expansion of the available finan-
cial resources and the imposition of targeted ex post monitor-
ing on countries accessing FCLA. Collectively, these reforms
would help constrain the build-up of risk within the Eurodol-
lar market and ameliorate the potential moral hazard prob-
lems associated with this state-sponsored liquidity support for
private markets and institutions.
This Article makes two distinct contributions to the rapidly
expanding literature examining the sources of financial insta-
bility and the theory and practice of international financial
crisis management. First, it describes the important and var-
ied roles that the modern Eurodollar market plays within the
international financial system. While a great deal has already
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been written about the Eurodollar market, the preponderance
of the existing literature explores questions around its role as
a vehicle for regulatory arbitrage and whether its enormous
growth contributes to the aggregate money supply and, thus,
inflation. With some notable exceptions, this literature also
has a tendency to describe the Eurodollar market at a high
level of abstraction, thereby contributing to the considerable
degree of confusion around what the Eurodollar market is,
how it works, and why it is so important. In sharp contrast,
this Article provides a more detailed description of the me-
chanics of various components of the Eurodollar market and
examines how they can contribute to financial instability. Se-
cond, this Article identifies the challenges that a large Euro-
dollar market poses in terms of effective international finan-
cial crisis management. It then identifies and evaluates the
relative merits of various alternatives for how one might go
about addressing these challenges with the objective of pro-
moting greater global financial stability.
This Article is organized into six parts. Part II begins by
tracing the origins of the Eurodollar market and documenting
its tremendous growth in recent decades. It also describes the
basic mechanics of this market and the important roles that it
plays in supporting international trade, finance, and invest-
ment. Part III describes the functions of conventional ELA fa-
cilities. It also describes the unique challenges posed by the
existence of a large Eurodollar market and the corresponding
need for a credible framework for the provision of FCLA. Part
IV chronicles the important role of the Eurodollar market in
the thick of the global financial crisis, along with the unprec-
edented measures taken by the Federal Reserve and other
major central banks to inject U.S. dollar liquidity into the in-
ternational financial system. Part V then examines the vari-
ous ways that one might seek to strengthen this emerging in-
ternational financial crisis management architecture. Part VI
concludes.
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II. THE ORIGINS, MECHANICS, AND GROWTH OF
THE EURODOLLAR MARKET
The Eurodollar market consists of liabilities-promises to
pay-issued by banks and other financial institutions that are
denominated in the currency of a country other than the one
in which the institution is incorporated and licensed to carry
on business. 26 These liabilities are issued on a short-term ba-
sis, with the issuer typically obligated to deliver the relevant
currency on demand, upon the occurrence of a specified con-
tingency, or at the expiry of a fixed period, ranging from over-
night up to one year.27 The term "Eurodollar" is derived from
the oldest, largest, and arguably best-known segment of this
market: the market for U.S. dollar time deposits offered by
banks incorporated and licensed in the United Kingdom and
Continental Europe.28 In practice, however, the term has long
been used more expansively to describe short-term foreign
currency liabilities of any denomination issued by financial in-
stitutions incorporated and licensed in any country. 29
Like many other financial innovations, the emergence and
early growth of the modern Eurodollar market in the 1960s
and 1970s was the product of regulatory arbitrage.3 0 The pri-
26 Alexander K. Swoboda, The Euro-Dollar Market: An Interpretation,
in 64 ESSAYS IN INT'L FIN. 1, 1 (1968).
27 The Eurodollar market can be distinguished from the market for
longer-term foreign currency liabilities, generally known as the Eurobond
market.
28 See generally Ronald I. McKinnon, The Eurocurrency Market, in 125
ESSAYS IN INT'L FIN. 1, 2 (1977); Swoboda, supra note 26, at 1; Friedman,
supra note 25, at 17.
29 McKinnon, supra note 28, at 2.
30 See, e.g., PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED
BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT 71-75 (2011) (describing the emer-
gence of parallel loans-the precursor to modern swap markets-in re-
sponse to capital controls imposed under the Bretton Woods system of fixed
exchange rates); Timothy Q. Cook & Jeremy G. Duffield, Money Market Mu-
tual Funds: A Reaction to Government Regulation or a Lasting Innovation?,
FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND EcON. REV., July/Aug. 1979, at 15, 27-29 (de-
scribing the emergence of money market funds in response to the con-
straints imposed under Federal Reserve Regulation Q).
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mary impetus for this arbitrage was the impact of U.S. Fed-
eral Reserve Regulations D and Q.31 Regulation D establishes
a minimum fraction of customer deposits that federally li-
censed banks are required to hold in the form of non-interest
bearing central bank reserves. 32 These reserve requirements
thus impose a constraint on the amount of deposit funding
that banks can use to make loans and other investments. Be-
fore being phased out in 1986 (and ultimately repealed in
2011), Regulation Q prohibited banks from paying interest on
demand deposits and imposed a ceiling on the interest rates
that banks were permitted to pay on time deposits and sav-
ings deposits.33
The combined effect of Regulations D and Q was to under-
mine the competitiveness of U.S. banks in relation to their in-
ternational peers. Where market interest rates on deposits ex-
ceeded the ceiling under Regulation Q-as they did
continuously between 1966 and 1986 34-depositors could shift
their savings to banks in countries such as the United King-
31 For early work examining this impact, see McKinnon, supra note 28,
at 5-10; Friedman, supra note 25, at 17-18, 24; Lawrence L. Kreicher, Eu-
rodollar Arbitrage, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. Q. REV., Summer 1982, at 10.
Secondary drivers of this arbitrage were the direct and indirect capital con-
trols imposed under the Bretton Woods monetary and exchange rate frame-
work. McKinnon, supra note 28, at 8; Friedman, supra note 25, at 17-18.
The desire of market participants in some jurisdictions-perhaps most no-
tably the former Soviet Union-to hold U.S. dollars outside the United
States in order to avoid potential seizure also likely contributed to early
demand for Eurodollar deposits. See PAUL EINZIG, THE EURO-DOLLAR SYSTEM
30 (5th ed. 1973).
32 See Reserve Requirements of Depositary Institutions (Regulation D),
12 C.F.R. § 204 (2012). Today, Regulation D also applies to "euro-currency"
liabilities of federally licensed banks. Id.
33 See Payment of Interest on Demand Deposits, 12 U.S.C. § 371(a)
(1979) (repealed 2011). See also 76 Fed. Reg. 42015 (July 18, 2011) (repeal-
ing Regulation Q effective July 21, 2011).
34 See R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for Regulation Q: What It Did and Why
It Passed Away, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., Feb. 1986, at 22, 29.
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dom that adopted a more laissez faire approach toward inter-
est rates. 35 Similarly, insofar as the Fed's reserve require-
ments were more onerous than those imposed on U.S. dollar
deposits in other countries, borrowers in the United States
could often lower their cost of capital by borrowing U.S. dol-
lars from foreign banks.36 The extension of these loans would
then create new Eurodollar deposits. 37 Predictably, the com-
petitive distortions created by these differences in regulatory
treatment precipitated a shift in U.S. dollar deposits and
loans from banks in the United States to those in the United
Kingdom, Europe, and elsewhere.
Given its origins, there is a tendency to view the Eurodol-
lar market purely as a creature of regulatory arbitrage. Today,
however, banks and other financial institutions issue Euro-
dollar liabilities for a variety of different reasons. Many of
these reasons reflect the day-to-day needs of commercial firms
operating within the global economy. These firms make and
receive payments in foreign currencies in the normal course of
business. When Apple Inc. purchases camera components
from Sony for use in the iPhone 7, for example, it might pay
Sony in Japanese yen. 38 When Apple then sells the fully as-
35 See McKinnon, supra note 28, at 2, 5-10; Friedman, supra note 25,
at 17-18. See also Catherine R. Schenk, The Origins of the Eurodollar Mar-
ket in London: 1955-1963, 35 EXPLS. IN EcoN. HIST. 221 (1998)
36 See Dong He & Robert N. McCauley, Offshore Markets for the Domes-
tic Currency: Monetary and Financial Stability Issues 14 (Bank for Int'l Set-
tlements, Working Paper No. 320, 2010) (citing Robert N. McCauley &
Rama Seth, Foreign Bank Credit to U.S. Corporations: The Implications of
Offshore Loans, 17 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. Q. REV., Spring 1992, at 52).
37 While the reason for this may not seem immediately obvious to the
casual observer, it is sufficient for the present purposes simply to observe
that the extension of bank loans typically involves crediting the borrower's
account with the bank. In this way, new loans serve to create new deposit
liabilities. For a more detailed description, see MICHAEL McLEAY ET AL.,
BANK OF ENG., QUARTERLY BULLETIN 2014 Q1: MONEY CREATION IN THE MOD-
ERN ECONOMY 14 (2014), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Doc-
uments/quarterlybulletin/2014/qbl4qlprereleasemoneycrea-
tion.pdf#page=1 [perma.cc/ZU6A-HZ78]; supra Section III.A.
38 Alternatively, of course, Apple can pay Sony in U.S. dollars. Either
way, one of the two firms is dealing in a foreign currency.
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sembled iPhone at its store in Covent Garden, London, it re-
ceives payment in Pound Sterling. As a U.S. firm incorporated
and headquartered in California, Apple may then seek to
hedge the foreign exchange risk stemming from both its global
supply chain and international sales.39 Similarly, the prices of
some goods (e.g., crude oil) are only quoted in a single currency
(e.g., U.S. dollars), thus necessitating that all prospective pur-
chasers hold reserves of, and all sellers accept payments in,
this currency. Understandably, firms that make and receive
payments in foreign currencies often look to domestic banks
and other financial institutions to provide the commercial ac-
counts, wholesale funding, and risk management services nec-
essary to support their international operations.40 For this
reason, economic globalization and a robust Eurodollar mar-
ket are often viewed as going hand in hand. 1.
A second and related reason why banks and other financial
institutions issue Eurodollar liabilities is to support interna-
tional trade. While reliable data is scarce, it has been esti-
mated that approximately half of all international trade is in-
voiced and settled in U.S. dollars. 41 Understandably, the
dominance of the dollar in international trade incentivizes im-
porters and exporters outside the United States to maintain
dollar denominated bank accounts in order to accept and
make payments in U.S. dollars.42 The majority of these ac-
counts are held with banks incorporated and licensed outside
39 As it happens, one of the ways in which Apple in particular hedges
the foreign exchange risk stemming from its international sales is to fre-
quently update its domestic prices in response to changes in the exchange
rate between the domestic currency and the U.S. dollar. However, most
firms do not enjoy this degree of market power and thus rely on financial
intermediaries to help them manage their foreign exchange risk.
40 Firms may do so for several reasons, ranging from pre-existing rela-
tionships, to higher interest rates on domestic deposits, to preferential tax
treatment.
41 Benjamin J. Cohen, Currency and State Power, in BACK TO BASICS:
STATE POWER IN A CONTEMPORARY WORLD 159, 167 (Martha Finnemore &
Judith Goldstein eds., 2013). See Linda S. Goldberg & C6dric Tille, Vehicle
Currency Use in International Trade, J. INT'L ECON., Dec. 2008, at 177, 184-
85 (providing a more detailed country-by-country breakdown).
42 See Swoboda, supra note 26, at 6.
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the United States.4 3 Foreign banks are also an important
source of trade financing. One of the most widely used forms
of trade financing are letters of credit. Letters of credit repre-
sent a commitment by a bank to an exporter (seller) on behalf
of an importer (buyer) to make or guarantee payment for
goods upon receipt of documentary evidence that they have
been delivered. Letters of credit can thus be understood as a
form of insurance against the risk of non-payment by the im-
porter. These letters of credit possess two important features
for the present purposes. First, most letters of credit are is-
sued on a relatively short-term basis: with maturities typi-
cally ranging from seventy to ninety days.44 Second, and re-
flecting the currency composition of international trade more
generally, the International Chamber of Commerce estimates
that over eighty percent of all letters of credit are denomi-
nated in U.S. dollars.45
A third reason why financial institutions issue Eurodollar
liabilities is to execute what is known as a foreign currency
'carry trade.' Foreign currency carry trades seek to exploit dif-
ferences between the costs of borrowing in one currency rela-
tive to the expected return on financial assets denominated in
another currency. Thus, for example, a German investment
bank might borrow cheaply in Japanese yen and then invest
the proceeds in higher-yielding Australian dollar-denomi-
nated assets. Where successful, the bank stands to capture the
difference-or 'spread'-between its yen-borrowing costs and
its Australian dollar investment returns. Simultaneously, of
course, the trade exposes the investment bank to exchange
rate volatility and, more specifically, the risk that the yen
might appreciate against the Australian dollar over the dura-
tion of the trade. 46 Importantly, the foreign currency borrow-
43 He & McCauley, supra note 36, at 2-4.
44 See COMMITTEE ON THE GLOBAL FIN. Sys. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLE-
MENTS, TRADE FINANCE: DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES 14 (2014).
45 See INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 2016 RETHINKING TRADE & FI-
NANCE: AN ICC PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE 58 (2016).
46 At this point, the bank will either have to rollover its (now more ex-
pensive) yen borrowing, or simply repay its yen-denominated liabilities.
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ing necessary to execute this trade often takes the form of for-
eign exchange (or "f/x") swaps, commercial paper, repo agree-
ments, and other short-term wholesale liabilities.
Finally, banks and other financial institutions create Eu-
rodollar liabilities in the context of their general financing and
market-making activities. Many investment banks, for exam-
ple, borrow funds within f/x swap, foreign currency repo, and
other wholesale funding markets in order to raise capital and
manage mismatches between the currency composition of
their assets and liabilities.4 7 Investment banks also create
and market structured finance products, f/x swaps, and other
derivatives to their clients.4 8 Structured finance products and
derivatives are not typically viewed as creating Eurodollar li-
abilities. Nevertheless, where these instruments are denomi-
nated in a currency not issued by a country in which one or
both parties carry on business, they ultimately share a num-
ber of important similarities. Most importantly for the present
purposes, these instruments typically include state-contin-
gent contractual mechanisms such as variation margin, close-
out netting, and novation requirements designed to protect
the contracting parties against changes in counterparty credit
and market risks.49 When these mechanisms are triggered,
they require parties to deliver the agreed foreign currency, of-
ten within a relatively short time frame.50 These ostensibly
long-term contracts thus include embedded short-term foreign
currency liabilities.
This risk can of course be hedged, but at the expense of the expected profit-
ability of the trade.
47 See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 15, at 452-54.
48 See id. at 460-65, 468-69.
49 See id. at 469-72.
50 See generally Darrell Duffie, The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks,
24 J. EcoN. PERSP. 51, 55-58 (2010) (describing the vulnerability of dealers
to runs by derivatives and repo counterparties and other creditors); Mark J.
Roe, The Derivatives Market's Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accel-
erator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 542-43 (2011) (describing the runs by deriva-
tives and repo counterparties on AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers).
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FIGURE 1: BANKING SECTOR FOREIGN CURRENCY LIABILI-
TIES (1980-2015)51
Swiss franc E Euro
Japanese yen M US donar
* Powd sterung * Other
Us trimons 30
- 2s
- zo
10
5
0
1980 85 90 95 2000 05 10 15
Reflecting their wide range of potential uses in interna-
tional trade, finance, and investment, the outstanding stock
of Eurodollar liabilities has increased significantly over the
past several decades. While limitations on available data have
long made measuring the size of the Eurodollar market diffi-
cult, figures recently released by the Bank for International
Settlements (the "BIS") shed some light on the enormous
growth of the global banking system's foreign currency liabil-
ities between 1980 and 2015 (Figure 1). These figures show
foreign currency liabilities peaking at approximately $USD25
trillion on the eve of the global financial crisis, with more than
half of this amount made up of liabilities denominated in U.S.
dollars.5 2 To put these figures into perspective, the total stock
51 EDD DENBEE ET AL, BANK OF ENG., FINANCIAL STABILITY PAPER No. 36:
STITCHING TOGETHER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SAFETY NET 6 fig.3 (2016),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fpc/fspa-
pers/fs paper36.pdf [perma.cc/X4DN-PS4A].
52 See id.
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of domestic U.S. dollar deposits held by commercial banks in-
sured by the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the
"FDIC") was approximately $USD11.7 trillion at the end of
2016.53
Ultimately, of course, these figures only provide us with an
impressionistic sense of the size of the global Eurodollar mar-
ket. Specifically, insofar as these figures include longer-term
foreign currency liabilities of banks (and exclude short-term
foreign currency liabilities of non-bank financial intermediar-
ies and contingent foreign currency liabilities embedded
within structured finance products and other derivatives),
these figures overstate (understate) the true size of this mar-
ket. Nevertheless, these figures underscore both the im-
portant roles that the Eurodollar market plays within the
global economic and financial system and its dramatic growth
in recent decades.
III. FINANCIAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND THE
PROBLEM OF FCLA
The growth and importance of the Eurodollar market poses
a number of challenges for central banks charged with the re-
sponsibility for financial crisis management. As articulated
most famously by Walter Bagehot, the core principles of finan-
cial crisis management call upon central banks to lend freely,
against good quality collateral, and at a penalty rate of inter-
est, to solvent but illiquid banks and other financial institu-
tions during periods of widespread panic and instability. 54
This prescription, often referred to as "Bagehot's Dictum,"
represents the animating spirit, if not always the strict legal
53 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., LATEST INDUSTRY TRENDS: STATISTICS AT
A GLANCE (2016), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2016dec/indus-
try.pdf [perma.cclX4DN-PS4A].
54 See BAGEHOT, supra note 19, at 21-22. While Bagehot is often cred-
ited with having first articulated these principles, that honour largely falls
to fellow Englishman Henry Thornton. See generally HENRY THORNTON, AN
ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF THE PAPER CREDIT OF GREAT BRIT-
AIN (F. A. v. Hayek ed., Farrar & Rinehart 1939) (1802).
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letter, underpinning the diverse array of institutional ar-
rangements through which central banks provide 'lender of
last resort' or ELA facilities. 55
Historically, the core principles of financial crisis manage-
ment have been developed and applied predominantly at the
domestic level, with national central banks providing ELA to
the domestic banking system, denominated in the domestic
currency. 56 As a consequence, these principles have not fully
evolved to reflect the emergence and growth of the Eurodollar
market. This Part describes these principles. It then identifies
the significant practical constraints in applying these princi-
ples in a world where banks and other financial institutions
rely heavily on the issuance of Eurodollar liabilities and
where, accordingly, these institutions are likely to require
FCLA during periods of widespread panic and instability.
A. The Fundamentals of Emergency Liquidity
Assistance
In order to understand the fundamentals of ELA, one must
first understand the peculiar business of banking. The defin-
ing feature of banks is that they raise a significant proportion
of their capital through the issuance of short-term, liquid lia-
bilities. These liabilities include demand, time, and other
types of deposits, along with short-term wholesale borrowing
from other banks and financial institutions through the com-
mercial paper and repo markets. 57 Banks then invest this cap-
55 See Xavier Freixas et al., Lender of Last Resort: A Review of the Lit-
erature, FIN. STABLITY REV. 151 (1999).
56 This domestic focus is reflected in the academic and policy literature.
See generally id. at 158-59, 162. FCLA discussions have often been in ex-
tremely vague terms. See Bank for Int'l Settlements, Statement of Central
Bankers, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 11, 1974, at 64 ("The governors also had an ex-
change of views on the problem of the lender of last resort in the Euromar-
kets. They recognized that it would not be practical to lay down in advance
detailed rules and procedures for the provision of temporary liquidity.").
57 The mix of deposits and wholesale funding as a proportion of total
bank financing has notably changed over time. A recent study covering sev-
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ital in longer term, illiquid loans, mortgages, and other finan-
cial assets. In the language of financial economics, banks thus
engage in significant levels of credit, liquidity, and maturity
transformation by taking the short-term, liquid liabilities
owed to depositors and converting them into longer-term, il-
liquid investments in households, businesses, and govern-
ments.58
Importantly, the credit, liquidity, and maturity transfor-
mation performed by conventional deposit-taking banks in-
volves considerably more than the simple intermediation of
savings from depositors to borrowers. 5 9 It also represents an
important source of private money creation. When a bank
makes a loan, the proceeds of the loan are credited to the bor-
rower's bank account.6 0 The extension of a new loan can thus
be understood as mechanically resulting in the creation of new
deposits.6 1 These new deposits can then be used to purchase
goods, pay for services, or make investments. In short, these
deposits can be used as money-money that would not have
existed but for the extension of the loan. Rather than merely
acting as a conduit for the accumulation and allocation of cap-
ital, the business of banking thus necessarily involves a sig-
nificant level of credit and, ultimately, money creation. 62 The
important role played by banks in creating money is reflected
enteen countries, for example, reports a shift in deposit funding from ap-
proximately 80% of total finding following World War II to approximately
50% by the early 2000s. Oscar JordA et al., Bank Capital Redux: Solvency,
Liquidity, and Crisis 11-12 (Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working
Paper No. 2017-06, 2017).
58 See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 15, at 277-78 (describing banks as
performing credit, maturity, and liquidity transformation).
59 See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 13, at 1148 (delineating between
the 'credit-intermediation,' 'credit- multiplication,' and 'credit-creation' mod-
els of finance).
60 See generally McLeay et al., supra note 37, at 3-5.
61 See id. at 1.
62 See id. at 2-4.
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in the value of outstanding bank deposits relative to other
components of the aggregate money supply (Figure 2).63
FIGURE 2: COMPONENTS OF THE U.S. MONEY SUPPLY
($USD AS OF MARCH 2017)
Component of Money Amount
Supply (in billions)
Currency in circulation $1,513,317 9.8%
ReserveS64 $2,314,729 15.0%
Commercial bank deposits65 $11,594,200 75.2%
TOTAL $15,422,246 100%
The business of banking works well so long as large num-
bers of depositors or other short-term creditors do not demand
their money back at the same time. 66 Where liquidity de-
mands remain uncorrelated, banks need only maintain a
small reserve of cash or other highly liquid assets to satisfy
63 See FED. RESERVE SYs., H.3 AGGREGATE RESERVES OF DEPOSITARY IN-
STITUTIONS AND THE MONETARY BASE (2017), https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/releases/h3/current/h3.pdf [perma.cclVNB8-VV5Z]; FED. RESERVE
Sys., H.8 ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/h8.pdf
[perma.cc/LJ47-XEDW]. The Federal Reserve also publishes weekly "Money
Stock Measures" (H.6) that report slightly different figures.
64 Includes total reserves maintained with the Federal Reserve System
and vault cash used to satisfy required reserves. FED. RESERVE SYs., H.3
AGGREGATE RESERVES OF DEPOSITARY INSTITUTIONS AND THE MONETARY
BASE (2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/current/h3.pdf
[perma.cc/96VC-TQQS].
65 The Federal Reserve's Money Stock Measures report a slightly
smaller $USD11,289,500 billion in demand, time, and other checkable de-
posits at commercial banks and thrifts as of February 2017. Id.
66 See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit
Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL'Y EcON. 401, 402 (1983) (describing how
the demand deposit system permits efficient risk sharing where depositors
demand liquidity at random times). See generally Franklin Allen et al.,
Moral Hazard and Government Guarantees in the Banking Industry, 1 J.
FIN. REG. 30 (2015) (providing a recent survey of the literature on the fra-
gility of banks).
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idiosyncratic withdrawals.6 7 When combined with the fact
that new loans create new deposits, this 'fractional reserve'
model enables banks to extend a large volume of loans on the
foundations of a relatively small deposit base.6 8 By the same
token, however, where the liquidity demands of short-term
creditors become correlated, the reliance by banks on short-
term, liquid liabilities to finance investments in longer term,
illiquid assets renders these institutions vulnerable to desta-
bilizing runs by depositors and other short-term creditors. 69
The fragility of bank balance sheets is typically framed in
one of two ways. The first views runs as a multiple equilib-
rium (or coordination) problem amongst short-term credi-
tors.7 0 Pursuant to this account, each creditor's decision about
whether to run is a function not only of their demand for li-
quidity and evaluation of the issuer's creditworthiness, but
also-and crucially-their subjective perception of whether
other creditors are likely run.7 1 The second account views runs
as a product of the realization by short-term creditors that as-
sets that they previously believed to represent reliable stores
of nominal value--or "moneyneSS" 72-are in fact sensitive to
the revelation of new information about the creditworthiness
of the issuer, the quality of any underlying collateral, or other
67 The term "withdrawals" in this context includes the failure to rollo-
ver short-term wholesale funding.
68 An example may help illustrate this point. Imagine a bank extends
a loan of $100 to a borrower. This loan results in $100 of new deposits. As-
suming a 10% reserve ratio, the bank is able to extend an additional $90 of
loans on the basis of these new deposits. These new loans will then result
in $90 of new deposits, enabling the bank to extend $USD81 in new loans.
This process could theoretically continue ad infinitum.
69 See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 66, at 402.
70 See id. at 402-03, 417-18.
71 See id.
72 See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, MONETARY STA-
TISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: ESTIMATES, SOURCES, METHODS, 151-52
(1970); J. R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL, 163 (2nd ed., Clarendon Press 1946)
(1939).
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variables. 73 Pursuant to this second account, rather than in-
vesting the time and energy necessary to incorporate this new
information into the price of these assets, creditors may
simply prefer to shift to less informationally-sensitive substi-
tutes that, in effect, possess a higher degree of moneyness.74
Where the liquidity demands of depositors and other short-
term creditors exceed available reserves, banks are left with
two possible options. The first is to seek funding from other
financial institutions within wholesale funding markets. The
availability of this option will depend on market perceptions
of the borrower's solvency,75 along with whether or not pro-
spective lenders within this market are themselves facing-or
anticipate facing-similar liquidity problems. 76 The second
option is to sell loans or other financial assets and to use the
proceeds to satisfy the bank's obligations to short-term credi-
tors. Crucially, however, where banks are forced to sell longer-
term, opaque, and illiquid assets within a short time frame,
this will reduce the probability that these institutions will be
able to sell these assets at full market value. As a result,
banks may be forced to accept losses on long-term assets in
order to honor their liabilities to short-term creditors.
73 See generally GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE
PANIC OF 2007 (2010); Bengt Holmstrom, Understanding the Role of Debt in
the Financial System (Bank of Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 479,
Jan. 2015), https://www.bis.org/publ/work479.pdf [perma.cclH44L-C4PV].
The key difference between this account and multiple equilibrium views of
run-like behavior is the absence of a coordination problem, i.e., creditors in
this second account do not switch in anticipation of the decisions of other
creditors.
74 See generally GORTON, supra note 73; Holmstrom, supra note 73.
75 See Freixas et al., supra note 55, at 153.
76 See Mark J. Flannery, Financial Crises, Payment System Problems,
and Discount Window Lending, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 804, 805-
06 (1996) (suggesting that banks may become more reluctant to lend in the
wholesale market during periods of crisis); Xavier Freixas et al., Systemic
Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank, 32
J. OF MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 611, 611, 613 (2000) (presenting a model in
which banks are reluctant to lend in the wholesale market owing to uncer-
tainty about their own ability to borrow in the market in the future).
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Through this channel, what began as a short-term liquidity
problem can quickly evolve into a full-blown solvency problem.
However one elects to frame the source of this fragility, the
destabilizing run-like behavior at the heart of bank runs can
escalate into more generalized panics characterized by the
widespread withdrawal of financing by short-term creditors
and a resulting "scramble for high-powered money." 77 These
generalized panics can be understood as throwing the frac-
tional reserve model into reverse: with the flight of short-term
creditors reducing the deposit base and precipitating fire sales
of loans and other assets, and the sale of loans mechanically
resulting in further reductions in the deposit base. 78 Morgan
Ricks has characterized this relationship among runs, finan-
cial panics, and private money creation as "the money prob-
lem" 79 and views it as "far and away the biggest threat the
financial system poses to the broader economy."o
At the core of this problem is the contraction in the supply
of privately created money during financial panics and the re-
sulting impact on the real economy. 81 These contractions force
financial institutions that rely on short-term funding to sell
77 Anna J. Schwartz, Real and Pseudo-Financial Crises, in MONEY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 271 (1987).
78 Although at a systemic level, the reduction in deposits will only serve
to reduce the aggregate money supply where the withdrawn funds flow out
of the conventional banking system. See George G. Kaufman, Lender of Last
Resort: A Contemporary Perspective, in FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND
THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 169, 174 (Charles Goodhart & Gerhard Illing
eds., 2002).
79 MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGU-
LATION (2016).
80 Id. at 103.
81 In this respect, Ricks draws on Friedman and Schwartz's analysis of
the monetary causes of the Great Depression. See generally MILTON FRIED-
MAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1867-1960 (1971). Ricks also relies on the empirical evidence of Vic-
toria Ivashina and David Scharfstein relating to the financial crisis of 2007-
09. See Victoria Ivashina & David Scharfstein, Bank Lending During the
Financial Crisis of 2008, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 319 (2010).
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assets in order to cover their short-term liabilities.82 The re-
sulting fire sales lead to a fall in asset prices and a correspond-
ing increase in the yields on these assets. The increase in
yields then changes the opportunity cost calculus for financial
institutions looking to make new investments-precipitating
an increase in borrowing costs for households, businesses, and
governments, and a corresponding decrease in levels of invest-
ment and economic activity.83 Viewed from this perspective,
panics drive contractions in the money supply, which in turn
threaten to drive contractions in economic growth.
It is against the backdrop of this threat that the functions
of state support for the conventional banking system can be
most clearly understood. 84 The first-microprudential-func-
tion is to reduce the risk of idiosyncratic bank runs.85 The se-
cond-macroprudential-function is to prevent bank runs and
other shocks from escalating into more widespread panics
and, ultimately, contractions in the money supply and eco-
nomic growth. 86 While early writers such as Bagehot and
Henry Thornton arguably viewed ELA as performing solely a
macroprudential function, more recent observers have empha-
sized the largely complementary relationship between these
two functions insofar as the failure to support individual in-
stitutions can, in some cases, precipitate more widespread
panic and financial instability.87
82 RICKS, supra note 79, at 110.
83 See id. at 110-11.
84 Although, as Thomas M. Humphrey and Robert E. Keleher have ob-
served, these functions are rarely spelled out, leading to significantly diver-
gent understandings in practice. Thomas M. Humphrey & Robert E. Kele-
her, The Lender of Last Resort: A Historical Perspective, in FINANCIAL
CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 73 (2002).
85 See Freixas et al., supra note 55.
86 See Freixas et al., supra note 55, at 153; Humphrey, supra note 21,
at 8-9; Humphrey & Keleher, supra note 84, at 74-75; Kaufman, supra note
78, at 173-74.
87 In effect, this second perspective reflects the idea that some financial
institutions are "too big to fail" in the sense that their failure is expected to
trigger more widespread panic and market disruption. See Freixas et al.,
supra note 55, at 152; Kaufman, supra note 78, at 169. See generally Marvin
Goodfriend & Robert G. King, Financial Deregulation, Monetary Policy, and
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There are two basic ways that the state can perform these
functions. The first is deposit insurance. While deposit insur-
ance schemes vary across jurisdictions, the basic strategy is to
have a third-party guarantee depositors' funds in the event of
bank failure. This third party effectively steps into the shoes
of the bank: honoring the bank's commitments to depositors
during periods of institutional distress. 88 In order to make this
commitment credible, the government typically provides this
third-party guarantee through institutions such as the FDIC.
The introduction of deposit insurance beginning in the United
States in the 1930's is often credited with having significantly
enhanced the level of consumer protection enjoyed by bank de-
positors. 89 However, insofar as these schemes generally only
protect a subset of a bank's short-term creditors-typically re-
tail depositors with accounts below a specified threshold-it is
at best an incomplete strategy for counterbalancing the inher-
ent fragility of bank balance sheets.
The second, far older, and far broader strategy is ELA. Dis-
tilled to its essence, ELA is "the discretionary provision of li-
quidity to a financial institution (or the market as a whole) by
the central bank in reaction to an adverse shock which causes
an abnormal increase in demand for liquidity which cannot be
met by an alternative source." 90 In effect, ELA is designed to
pump money into the financial system, thereby offsetting any
contraction in the private money supply and signaling to de-
positors and other short-term creditors that the central bank
will provide whatever support is necessary in order to restore
market confidence and financial stability. This liquidity typi-
Central Banking, in RESTRUCTURING BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES IN
AmERICA 216 (William S. Haraf & Rose Marie Kushmeider eds., 1988).
88 The third party then steps into the shoes of the depositors in order
to seek redress from the estate of the bank.
89 See, e.g., Andrew Campbell & Peter Cartwright, Deposit Insurance:
Consumer Protection, Bank Safety and Moral Hazard, 10 EUR. Bus. L. REV.
96, 96-97, 99 (1999) (describing the competing views of deposit insurance
as a mechanism for either protecting consumers or minimizing the risk of
bank runs).
90 Freixas et al., supra note 55, at 152.
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cally takes the form of short-term loans to banks or other fi-
nancial institutions experiencing temporary liquidity prob-
lems. These loans are fully secured by a pledge of eligible col-
lateral assets by the financial institutions receiving ELA.
Eligible collateral assets generally include commercial loans,
residential and commercial mortgages, government securi-
ties, investment grade bonds, asset-backed securities, and
other fixed income instruments. These collateral assets are
then subject to a discount-or "haircut"-designed to protect
the central bank against any decrease in their market value. 9 1
The institutional frameworks through which central banks
provide ELA vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In the
United States, the Federal Reserve has historically provided
ELA to eligible member banks through its discount window, a
standing collateralized loan facility.9 2 Pursuant to section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, the Fed can also extend ELA
to non-bank financial institutions under certain conditions in
the event of "unusual and exigent circumstances." 9 3 In the
91 This discount takes the form of a decrease in the amount of the loan
that can be secured against any given collateral asset.
92 For the framework implementing the Federal Reserve's discount
window, see generally Extensions of Credit by Federal Reserve Banks (Reg-
ulation A), 12 C.F.R. § 201 (2017). See also FED. RES. DISCOUNT WINDOW,
https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/ (Oct. 15, 2017) [perma.cc/K2AR-
GRM9]. The Fed can also extend ELA through its open market operations
(i.e., the purchase and sale of securities on the open market). Kaufman, su-
pra note 78, at 180-81. For a discussion of the conceptual problems of con-
flating ELA with open market operations, see generally Charles Goodhart,
Myths About the Lender of Last Resort, in FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION,
AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 227, 231 (Charles Goodhart & Gerhard
Illing eds., 2002).
93 Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2010). The provision of ELA
under section 13(3) must be pursuant to a program or facility with "broad-
based" eligibility, thereby prohibiting ad hoc support to individual institu-
tions. Unlike discount window lending, institutions in receipt of ELA under
section 13(3) must also demonstrate that they cannot secure credit accom-
modation from other financial institutions. As Kathryn Judge observes,
there are also a number of other government facilities that can be viewed
as performing a similar function. Kathryn Judge, Three Discount Windows,
99 CORNELL L. REV. 795 (2014) (describing, for example, the operations of
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United Kingdom, meanwhile, the Bank of England operates
its discount window, ELA, and other liquidity facilities under
separate frameworks, each of which are available to banks,
building societies, securities dealers, and central counterpar-
ties. 94
Predictably, the strategy of having central banks pump
money into the financial system-to "lend freely" in Bagehot's
terms-gives rise to potentially significant moral hazard prob-
lems. 95 Specifically, where banks and other financial institu-
tions anticipate that they will receive ELA, this may incentiv-
ize them to rely more heavily on short-term liabilities or invest
in more risky and illiquid assets. The other components of
Bagehot's dictum can each be understood as designed to con-
strain this problem. 96 The requirement that central banks
lend only against good quality collateral, for example, limits
the ability of banks to invest in risky and illiquid assets while
still retaining a sufficient portfolio of eligible collateral that
they can pledge for the purposes of obtaining ELA.97 For the
same reason, the fact that a bank is able to pledge good quality
the Federal Home Loan Bank in providing support to banks during the fi-
nancial crisis).
94 For a detailed description of the discount window and contingent
term repo facilities, see generally BANK OF ENG., THE BANK OF ENGLAND'S
STERLING MONETARY FRAMEWORK (2015). ELA is provided under a separate,
largely unpublished, framework and can be provided to any entity (includ-
ing but not limited to financial institutions). The Bank also administers an
index long-term repo facility designed for institutions with predictable
needs for liquid assets.
95 Once again, Henry Thornton seems to have been the first observer
to remark on this problem. THORNTON, supra note 54, at 188.
96 Ultimately, the capital, liquidity, and other forms of prudential reg-
ulation and intensive prudential supervision to which banks are subject also
play important roles in constraining potential moral hazard problems. For
a description of this regulation and supervision, see ARMOUR ET AL., supra
note 15, at chs. 14-16.
97 This requirement also serves to insulate central banks from counter-
party credit risk, along with any market risk stemming from volatility in
the price of pledged collateral.
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collateral serves as a credible signal of its solvency. 98 The re-
quirement to lend at a penalty rate of interest, meanwhile,
deters banks from relying on ELA where private market-
based sources of short-term financing are available. 99 Finally,
as banks and other financial institutions approach insolvency,
they have a natural incentive to take on more risk. The re-
quirement that ELA be extended only to financial institutions
experiencing temporary liquidity problems thus ensures that
fundamentally insolvent institutions do not use it in an at-
tempt to gamble for resurrection. Ultimately, while it is de-
batable whether Bagehot's dictum is always observed in prac-
ticelo-and while it may be a challenge to calibrate penalty
interest rates, define what constitutes good quality collateral,
and distinguish between illiquid and insolvent institu-
tions1o1-the components of this dictum coalesce to provide a
relatively coherent framework for understanding when and
how central banks should provide ELA to banks and other fi-
nancial institutions.
Over the past decade, the effectiveness of conventional
ELA frameworks in many jurisdictions has been tested by the
emergence and growth of the so-called "shadow" banking sys-
tem1 02 : non-bank financial intermediaries that perform credit,
liquidity, and maturity transformation without explicit access
98 Stanley Fischer, On the Need for an International Lender of Last Re-
sort, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 85, 90 (1999).
99 It also gives banks receiving ELA a strong incentive to pay back the
loans as soon as possible.
100 Michael D. Bordo, for example, points out several instances where
it appears Bagehot's dictum was not strictly observed, including the bailouts
of Franklin National (1974), First Pennsylvania (1980), Continental Illinois
(1984), and Johnson Matthey Bankers (1982). Michael D. Bordo, The Lender
of Last Resort: Alternative Views and Historical Experience, in FINANCIAL
CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 109, 122 (Charles
Goodhart & Gerhard Illing eds., 2002).
101 For a discussion of these challenges, see Goodhart, supra note 92,
at 229-34; Kaufman, supra note 78, at 178-81.
102 RICKS, supra note 79, at 160-63, 200-19.
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to ELA facilities or other forms of state support.103 During the
global financial crisis of 2007-09, for example, the Federal Re-
serve extended a relatively small proportion of its emergency
lending through its discount window.1 04 Instead, the Fed was
forced to introduce several new emergency lending facilities
designed to provide liquidity support to securities dealers,
money market mutual funds, and the tri-party repo, asset-
backed security, and asset-backed commercial paper mar-
kets.105 It also introduced bespoke facilities designed to pro-
vide support to systemically important institutions such as
Bear Stearns, AIG, Citigroup, and Bank of America. 106 Im-
portantly, conventional ELA frameworks were also exposed by
the crisis as not fit for purpose in a globally integrated and
interconnected financial system in which many banks and
other financial institutions required access to FCLA during
periods of widespread panic and financial instability.
103 See Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking, FED. RES. BANK N.Y.
EcoN. POL'Y REV., Dec. 2013, at 1 (defining shadow banks as non-bank fi-
nancial intermediaries that perform credit, liquidity, and maturity trans-
formation outside the regulated banking system).
104 See Stephen G. Cecchetti, Crisis and Responses: The Federal Re-
serve in the Early Stages of the Financial Crisis, 23 J. EcoN. PERSP. 51, 55
(2009) (reporting average borrowing through the discount window of ap-
proximately one billion dollars during the first seven months of the financial
crisis).
105 These facilities included the Term Securities Lending Facility and
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (designed to support securities dealers); the
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Facility,
Commercial Paper Funding Facility, and Money Market Investor Funding
Facility (designed to support money market mutual funds and the asset-
backed commercial paper market); and the Term Asset-Backed Securities
Loan Facility (designed to support the asset-backed security market). See
also Judge, supra note 93 (describing the operations of the Federal Home
Loan Bank in providing support to banks during the financial crisis).
106 For an overview of these facilities, see Dietrich Domanski et al.,
Central Banks as Lender of Last Resort: Experiences During the 2007-2010
Crisis and Lessons for the Future 6-9 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Washington, DC,
Divs. of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Fin, and Econ. Discus-
sion Series No. 2014-110, 2014).
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B. The Problem of FCLA
The core principles of financial crisis management envision
that the central banks responsible for providing ELA will pos-
sess several key attributes. The first and most important at-
tribute is the capacity to issue an unlimited stock of liabilities
that are universally accepted as a form of money within the
domestic economy.107 The defining feature of the Federal Re-
serve is that it can print U.S. dollars, the Bank of England
that it can print Pound Sterling. These central bank liabilities
are implicitly backed by the government's authority to raise
and collect taxes, and to dictate that these taxes be paid in the
domestic currency. Second, central banks must have the legal
authority to use these central bank liabilities to extend loans
or purchase assets denominated in the domestic currency for
the purpose of providing ELA. Third, central banks must have
operational frameworks in place that enable them to extend
ELA extremely rapidly-typically within a matter of days, if
not hours, from the moment at which it has been determined
that ELA is necessary in order to maintain or restore financial
stability.
These key attributes highlight the fact that conventional
ELA frameworks are designed to provide liquidity support to
banks and other financial institutions that raise capital and
make investments denominated in the domestic currency. But
what about financial institutions that raise capital and make
investments in foreign currencies? In short: what about the
Eurodollar market? Where financial institutions that rely
heavily on the Eurodollar market as a source of financing also
perform significant levels of credit, liquidity, and maturity
transformation, these institutions will be susceptible to desta-
bilizing runs by depositors and other short-term creditors. As
we have seen, these runs can escalate into broader contrac-
tions in the money supply within the domestic financial sys-
tem. The key difference in this case is that these runs will take
107 Anna J. Schwartz, Earmarks of a Lender of Last Resort, in FINAN-
CIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 449, 454-55
(Charles Goodhart & Gerhard Iing eds., 2002).
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place in foreign currency.10S This fairly benign observation ex-
poses the fundamental problem of FCLA: central banks only
have the capacity to print money denominated in their own
currency. The Bank of England cannot print new U.S. dollars
any more than the Federal Reserve can print Pound Ster-
ling.1O9 Nor can these central banks force foreign currency
creditors to accept payment in the domestic currency. 110 Ac-
cordingly, where financial institutions rely extensively on
short-term foreign currency financing, central banks will lack
the ability to create the critical resource needed to provide
ELA to the domestic financial system.
There are several ways that central banks can theoreti-
cally secure access to foreign currency for the purpose of
providing FCLA. The first option is to accumulate foreign cur-
rency reserves in denominations and amounts that reflect the
composition of the domestic financial system's short-term for-
eign currency liabilities. This option is essentially a form of
self-insurance against the prospect of eventually having to
provide FCLA. However, while this option may seem rela-
tively straightforward, it is also potentially costly and distor-
tive. As a preliminary matter, central banks pursuing this op-
tion will be exposed to fluctuations in the exchange rate
between the domestic and foreign currencies.111 In order to
limit the effects of accumulating foreign reserves on the do-
mestic money supply, central banks may also need to under-
take so-called "sterilization" measures: for example, selling
government securities in order to neutralize the monetary im-
pact of using domestic currency to purchase the required for-
eign currency. 1 12 These sterilization measures will be costly
108 See Roberto Chang & Andr6s Velasco, The Asian Liquidity Crisis
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6796, 1998) (describing
this problem in the context of the Asian liquidity crisis of 1997-98).
109 See Goodhart, supra note 92, at 235.
110 At least where this is not explicitly contemplated by the relevant
contracts. See id.
111 Denbee et al., supra note 51, at 9.
112 Id. The monetary effects of accumulating foreign exchange reserves
stem from the fact that these reserves need to be purchased with domestic
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where the yields on the government securities exceed the yield
on the central bank's foreign reserve holdings. 113 More
broadly, where a significant number of central banks simulta-
neously pursue the option of accumulating foreign currency
reserves, the resulting increase in demand for reserve curren-
cies such as the U.S. dollar may compress yields, thereby dis-
torting prices and potentially driving a search for yield among
investors. 114
The second option is to negotiate an ex ante contractual
right to borrow foreign currency in the event that it is required
in order to provide FCLA. The central bank of Argentina, for
example, has reportedly entered a series of repo agreements
with a syndicate of international banks enabling it to swap
government securities and other collateral in exchange for
U.S. dollars.1 15 Once again, however, this is likely to be an
extremely costly option as the borrower pays a fee for the op-
tion itself, along with interest on any borrowed funds.11 6 The
borrower would also be exposed to the risk that the U.S. dollar
might appreciate over the term of the agreement. More im-
portantly, this option would only be as effective as the lender's
ability to acquire sufficient foreign currency to meet its obli-
gations under the type of distressed market conditions in
which the borrowing central bank would be required to pro-
vide FCLA.
currency, thereby increasing the aggregate money supply. Selling govern-
ment securities in exchange for domestic currency can thus be used to offset
this increase.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Schwartz, supra note 107, at 457. See also Carolina Millan & Katia
Porzecanski, Argentina Agrees to Borrow $5 Billion from Wall Street Banks,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 29, 2016, 3:45 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ar-
ticles/2016-01-29/argentina-agrees-to-5-billion-of-loans-from-wall-street-
banks.
116 Schwartz reports that, under one such agreement entered into in
1996, the Central Bank of Argentina was required to pay a thirty-three ba-
sis point (0.33%) insurance premium plus an interest rate on borrowed
funds of LIBOR, 205 basis points (2.05%). Schwartz, supra note 107, at 457.
Borrowing costs will, of course, vary with both the currency in question and
the creditworthiness of the borrower.
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The third option is to purchase foreign currency on the
open market at the point in time at which it is actually needed
to provide FCLA. This option may be expedient and cost effec-
tive where central banks require foreign currency in order to
provide FCLA in response to idiosyncratic liquidity problems
or other localized shocks. However, where the catalyst for the
provision of FCLA is a more systemic shock-especially one
characterized by the breakdown of international wholesale
funding and foreign currency markets-central banks may be
left without a reliable private source of foreign currency li-
quidity. Under these circumstances, central banks that have
neglected to secure some form of ex ante (self-)insurance will
have no other option but to seek liquidity support from the
central bank that prints the relevant currency. Central banks
that pursue this option will thus find themselves in the vul-
nerable position of having to ask foreign policymakers for a
garden hose whenever their own house catches fire. As we
shall see in Part IV, this is precisely the position in which
many central banks found themselves in the thick of the
global financial crisis.
The extension of foreign currency loans from one central
bank to another for purposes of providing FCLA poses a host
of technical challenges. How can the central bank lending the
relevant currency ensure that the borrowing central bank only
provides FCLA against good quality collateral, at a penalty
rate of interest, and to solvent but illiquid banks and other
financial institutions? What forms of collateral should the
lender itself take against the obligations of the borrower? How
should it calculate any ex ante insurance premium, along with
the rate of interest on borrowed funds? Should there be limits
on the amount that central banks can borrow? And perhaps
most importantly, what mechanisms can be used to make the
commitments of both the lender and borrower as credible as
possible? The answers to these questions will understandably
have an impact on both the effectiveness of FCLA and the ex-
tent to which it gives rise to potential moral hazard problems.
Until relatively recently, the challenges of providing FCLA
were largely theoretical. Where FCLA was provided, it was
extended almost exclusively on an ad hoc basis in response to
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localized foreign currency liquidity shocks.11 7 Over the course
of the past several decades, however, the emergence and
growth of the Eurodollar market has dramatically increased
the risk of more systemic foreign currency liquidity problems
and, with them, the need for an effective framework for the
provision of FCLA. Just how urgently this framework was re-
quired would be exposed by the tumultuous events of 2007-
2009.
IV. THE EURODOLLAR MARKET AND THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 vividly illustrated
the potential systemic risks arising from the existence of a
large Eurodollar market. 118 Between 2000 and 2007, the boom
in U.S. real estate markets, the demand for 'safe' assets such
as U.S. treasury securities, and the globalization of banking
and institutional asset management combined with other fac-
tors to spur demand for U.S. dollar-denominated financial as-
sets by foreign banks and other financial institutions.11 9 The
BIS estimates that the outstanding stock of foreign claims
held by banks grew by roughly three times during this period:
from approximately $USD11 trillion at the end of 2000 to
117 For example, the $USD6 billion swap line extended by the United
States to Mexico in March 1994 in order to stabilize the peso following the
assassination of presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio. See MICHAEL
D. BORDO ET AL., STRAINED RELATIONS: U.S. FOREIGN EXCHANGE OPERATIONS
AND MONETARY POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 327 (2015).
118 For one of the first legal accounts of this aspect of the financial crisis
and the response of the Federal Reserve, see Colleen Baker, The Federal
Reserve's Use of International Swap Lines, 55 ARiz. L. REV. 603 (2013).
119 See Patrick McGuire & Goetz von Peter, The US Dollar Shortage in
Global Banking, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2009, at 47; Ben S. Bernanke et al., In-
ternational Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the United
States, 2008-2007 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res., Int'l Fin Discussion
Papers, No. 1014, 2011); Naohiko Baba et al., US Dollar Money Market
Funds and Non-US Banks, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2009, at 65.
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$USD31 trillion by the summer of 2007.120 A significant pro-
portion of these claims were denominated in foreign curren-
cies. 12 1
Many of the foreign banks and other financial institutions
that purchased U.S. dollar-denominated assets financed them
using one or a combination of U.S. dollar deposits, overnight
repo, and short-term commercial paper. 122 Many institutions
also relied on f/x swap markets to convert their domestic cur-
rency holdings into U.S. dollars.1 23 As a result, the longer
term U.S. dollar-denominated assets held by foreign banks
and other financial institutions were often supported by very
short-term liabilities that, in effect, required these institu-
tions to rollover their U.S. dollar funding on a more or less
continuous basis. 124 This funding model gave rise to an acute
form of funding (or 'rollover') risk: the risk that the amount of
new short-term dollar funding that these institutions would
be able to raise in any given period would be insufficient to
meet its obligations to holders of maturing short-term dollar
liabilities.1 25 Most importantly, this funding model left these
institutions highly vulnerable to the breakdown of repo, com-
mercial paper, and f/x swap markets.
In August 2007, what began as a localized disruption
within the U.S. subprime mortgage market metastasized into
a full-blown crisis within international wholesale funding
markets. As described by Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick,
120 McGuire & von Peter, supra note 119, at 50.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See WILLIAM A. ALLEN, INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY AND THE FINANCIAL
CRIsIs 33 (2013). This funding model involved selling the domestic currency
spot (for dollars) and buying it forward (with dollars). This, in turn, required
the institution to have access to the U.S. dollars necessary to repurchase
the domestic currency. As the crisis unfolded, the withdrawal of liquidity
from wholesale funding markets generated significant upward pressure on
prices with f/x swap markets. Id. at 50-51.
124 McGuire & von Peter, supra note 119, at 48, 53.
125 Id.
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concerns about counterparty credit risk led to a dramatic in-
crease in the costs of repo financing.1 26 These concerns also
precipitated the withdrawal of liquidity from both the com-
mercial paper 27 and f/x swap markets.1 28 As this liquidity
evaporated, financial institutions in the United States began
to accumulate dollars for the purposes of meeting their domes-
tic liabilities, resulting in a corresponding decrease in the
availability of U.S. dollar funding for financial institutions in
other jurisdictions.1 29 As a result, financial institutions out-
side the United States found it increasingly expensive-and
in some cases impossible-to roll over their short-term U.S
dollar liabilities.130 The BIS estimates that this U.S. dollar
funding gap for European banks was somewhere between
$USD1.1 and 1.3 trillion as of the summer of 2007.131 Signifi-
cant funding gaps also emerged for Japanese yen in the
United Kingdom, for euros in the United States, and for Swiss
francs in the euro area. 132
Financial institutions seeking to plug this U.S. dollar fund-
ing gap were confronted with a limited range of options. The
first option was to sell U.S. dollar-denominated assets. Gener-
ally speaking, the assets available for sale included U.S. treas-
ury securities, as well as dollar-denominated corporate bonds,
126 See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the
Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN EcON. 425 (2012).
127 See Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky:
Commercial Paper During the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 24 J. ECON.
PERSP. 29 (2010).
128 See Naohiko Baba et al., The Spillover of Money Market Turbulence
to FX Swap and Cross-Currency Swap Markets, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2008, at
73.
129 Rosalind Z. Wiggins & Andrew Metrick, The Federal Reserve's Fi-
nancial Crisis Response C: Providing US Dollars to Foreign Central Banks
(Yale Program on Fin. Stability Case Study 2015-1C-VI, 2016); Brun-
nermeier, supra note 24, at 95; ALLEN, supra note 123, at 32.
130 Wiggins & Metrick, supra note 129, at 8. Notably, the domestic (for-
eign) liabilities of U.S. (foreign) financial institutions included their contin-
gent liabilities to provide backstop liquidity to sponsored structured finance
vehicles. See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 15, ch. 21.
131 McGuire & von Peter, supra note 119, at 48.
132 ALLEN, supra note 123, at 38.
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asset-backed securities, structured finance products, and
other privately-issued debt securities.1 33 While the market for
U.S. treasury securities is the most liquid in the world, the
tightening of credit conditions within repo markets during the
crisis made these securities amongst the most sought-after
collateral assets.134 In many cases, financial institutions
would have therefore preferred to use these government secu-
rities to obtain U.S. dollar repo financing rather than sell
them outright.135 This left privately-issued debt securities as
the most likely candidates for sale. The problem here was that
prevailing market conditions during the crisis meant that fi-
nancial institutions would have often been forced to sell these
assets into illiquid and volatile markets, thus exposing them-
selves to potentially significant losses. Viewed from this per-
spective, correlated selling of dollar-denominated assets by fi-
nancial institutions seeking to plug the U.S. dollar funding
gap would have contributed to the pernicious fire sale dynam-
ics observed during the financial crisis.
The second option was for these financial institutions to
reduce their U.S. dollar lending activities.1 36 For many finan-
cial institutions outside the United States, this involved cut-
ting back on their trade financing and related currency hedg-
ing businesses. Data from the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development suggests that the value of
global merchandise trade decreased by forty-two percent be-
tween July 2008 and February 2009.137 While a considerable
133 McGuire & von Peter, supra note 119, at 58.
134 See Peter Hordah1 & Michael R. King, Developments in Repo Mar-
kets During the Financial Turmoil, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2008, at 37, 46.
135 Id.
136 Brunnermeier, supra note 24, at 95. For empirical evidence relating
to the reduction in dollar lending by European banks during the financial
crisis, see Victoria Ivashina et al., Dollar Funding and the Lending Behavior
of Global Banks (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18528,
2012).
137 Robert C. Shelburne, The Global Financial Crisis and its Impact on
Trade: The World and the Emerging European Economies 2 (U.N. Econ.
Comm. for Eur., Discussion Paper No. 2010.2, 2010).
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proportion of this decrease is no doubt attributable to a reduc-
tion in demand and production during the crisis, evidence sug-
gests that the U.S. dollar funding gap also contributed to a
reduction in credit supply and corresponding increase in the
costs of trade financing.1 38 The WTO has estimated that
spreads on short-term trade credit facilities peaked at be-
tween 300 to 600 basis points (or 3-6%) over LIBOR during
the crisis, compared with an average of between 10 to 20 basis
points under normal market conditions.1 39 This dramatic in-
crease in the costs of trade financing was compounded by the
illiquidity within the f/x swap market, which increased the
costs incurred by exporters in order to hedge against volatility
in the exchange rate between the U.S dollar and their domes-
tic currencies. 140 Through these channels, the global dollar
shortage at the height of the financial crisis likely contributed
to the generalized contraction of credit, international trade,
and economic growth.
The breakdown of private wholesale funding markets dur-
ing the financial crisis forced many banks and other eligible
financial institutions to seek ELA and other forms of govern-
ment support. 14 1 As we have already seen, however, the cen-
tral banks that administered conventional ELA facilities were
typically not in a position to provide the U.S. dollars and other
foreign currencies that these financial institutions re-
quired. 142 It was in response to this problem that the Federal
Reserve, in coordination with the central banks in several
138 See Daniel McDowell, Emergent International Liquidity Agree-
ments: Central Bank Cooperation after the Global Financial Crisis, J. INT'L
REL. & DEv. (forthcoming 2017).
139 The Challenges of Trade Financing, WTO (2009),
https://www.wto.org/englishl/thewto-elcoher_e/challenges-e.htm
[perma.cc/7NN6-A67Z].
140 McDowell, supra note 138.
141 ALLEN, supra note 123, at 49.
142 A notable exception were domestic subsidiaries of foreign banks,
which typically had access to domestic ELA facilities and could lend on the
borrowed currencies to their foreign parents. Wiggins & Metrick, supra note
129, at 7.
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other key jurisdictions, undertook one of the most ambitious
and important policy interventions of the financial crisis.
On December 12, 2007, the Federal Reserve announced
that it had entered into temporary reciprocal foreign currency
swap lines with the European Central Bank (the "ECB") and
the Swiss National Bank (the "SNB").143 These swap lines per-
mitted the ECB and SNB to exchange their domestic curren-
cies for U.S. dollars that could then be lent to banks and other
domestic financial institutions in order to plug their U.S. dol-
lar funding gaps. At the time, the Fed characterized the ex-
tension of these swap lines as designed to "address elevated
pressures in short-term funding markets." 14 4 In effect, the ob-
jective was to mitigate the risk that foreign financial institu-
tions would be unable to roll over their short-term U.S. dollar
liabilities, thereby reducing the pressure on these institutions
to engage in destabilizing fire sales of U.S. dollar-denomi-
nated assets or cut back on their trade financing and other
lending activities.145
These central bank swap lines worked as follows. When a
foreign central bank wished to draw on the swap line, it would
sell a given quantity of its own currency to the Federal Re-
serve at the prevailing exchange rate.146 Contemporaneously
with this sale, the central bank would agree to repurchase its
currency from the Fed at the same exchange rate at an agreed-
upon maturity date. 14 7 The foreign central bank would then
143 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal
Reserve and Other Central Banks Announce Measures Designed to Address
Elevated Pressures in Short-term Funding Markets (Dec. 12, 2007),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20071212a.htm
[perma.cc[BP2C-DCWR].
144 Id.
145 Michael J. Fleming & Nicolas J. Klagge, The Federal Reserve's For-
eign Exchange Swap Lines, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. CURRENT ISSUES IN EcON.
& FIN., April 2010, at 1, 3.
146 Id. at 2. While these swap lines were technically reciprocal, for ease
of exposition this description focuses on the mechanics of how foreign cen-
tral banks purchased U.S. dollars from the Federal Reserve, lent them on
to domestic financial institutions, and subsequently returned them to the
Fed.
147 Id.
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establish the eligibility requirements, range of acceptable col-
lateral, and other terms and conditions under which it would
lend the newly acquired dollars to domestic banks and other
financial institutions.14 8 It would then extend U.S. dollar
loans to eligible institutions, typically by way of fixed or vari-
able-rate auctions. 149 The duration of these loans ranged from
overnight, to one week, one month, and three month terms. At
the conclusion of the swap, the foreign central bank would re-
purchase its currency with U.S. dollars and pay the Fed inter-
est equal to the interest rate charged on the dollar loans ex-
tended to eligible institutions. 150 Importantly, the fact that
the foreign central bank stood between the Fed and eligible
institutions left it exposed to both credit risk in connection
with its U.S. dollar loans and, in the event that these loans
were not repaid before the expiry of the swap, foreign ex-
change risk in connection with its obligations to repurchase
its domestic currency. 151
The first swap lines established by the Federal Reserve
and other central banks were relatively modest in both their
scale and scope. The swap lines between the Fed and the ECB
and the SNB were initially capped at $USD20 billion and
$USD4 billion, respectively, and only approved for a period of
up to 6 months.1 52 However, as the financial crisis continued
148 See, e.g., News Release, Bank of Eng., U.S. Dollar Overnight Repo
Operations: Bank of England Market Notice (Sept. 22, 2008),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/market-
notice080918.pdf [perma.cc/2ZWU-7K9N].
149 Fleming & Klagge, supra note 145, at 2.
150 Id. While the Fed did not pay interest on the foreign currency it
received under the swap, it did commit to keep the currency in an account
in its name at the foreign central bank. Id. at 2-3.
151 Foreign exchange risk arises in this context by virtue of the neces-
sity of acquiring U.S. dollars on the open market in order to repurchase the
domestic currency. Specifically, were the U.S. dollar to appreciate against
the relevant currency during the term of the swap, the fact that the spot
and forward rates under the swap were identical would mean that the costs
of repurchasing the domestic currency in the second leg of the swap would
exceed the costs of acquiring dollars in the first leg.
152 Fed. Res. Press Release, supra note 143.
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to unfold, the Fed was compelled to expand this nascent net-
work of central bank swap lines and to pump significantly
more U.S. dollar liquidity into this network. Following the
failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, the Fed
announced a significant increase in the level of U.S. dollar
funding available under its swap lines with the ECB and
SNB.153 It also announced new swap lines with the Bank of
Japan ($USD60 billion), the Bank of England ($USD40 bil-
lion), and the Bank of Canada ($USD10 billion). 154 The follow-
ing week, the Fed extended swap lines to the Reserve Bank of
Australia ($USD10 billion), Svergis Riksbank ($USD10 bil-
lion), Norges Bank ($USD5 billion), and Danmarks National-
bank ($USD5 billion).1 55
In response to the continued deterioration of global credit
markets, the Fed announced on September 29 that it was
more than doubling the aggregate amount of U.S. dollars
available under these swap lines from $USD290 billion to
$USD620 billion.1 56 This was followed by the announcement
on October 13 that the Fed was removing the cap on its swap
lines with the ECB, SNB, and the Bank of England, thus ef-
fectively giving these central banks unlimited access to U.S.
dollar liquidity.1 57 The aggregate amount outstanding under
153 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal
Reserve and Other Central Banks Announce Further Measures to Address
Elevated Pressures in Funding Markets (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.feder-
alreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080918a.htm
[perma.cc/ZUW5-2YMG].
154 Id.
155 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal
Reserve and Other Central Banks Announce Additional Measures to Ad-
dress Elevated Pressures in Funding Markets (Sept. 24, 2008),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/mone-
tary/20080924a.htm [perma.cc/4VCR-7PV2].
156 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal
Reserve and Other Central Banks Announce Further Coordinated Actions
to Expand Significantly the Capacity to Provide U.S. Dollar Liquidity (Sept.
29, 2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/mone-
tary/20080929a.htm [perma.ccl2M9T-F7WR].
157 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal
Reserve and Other Central Banks Announce Further Measures to Provide
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these swap lines would peak at $US586 billion in December
2008 (see Figure 3).158 In total, the Federal Reserve would
make over $USD10 trillion available to foreign central banks
under these swap lines over the course of the financial cri-
sis.159 Similar central bank swap lines were established dur-
ing the crisis to provide euros, yen, Swiss francs, and Chinese
renminbi.1 60
FIGURE 3: DRAWINGS UNDER FEDERAL RESERVE SWAP
LINES (2007-2009)161
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Broad Access to Liquidity and Funding to Financial Institutions (Oct. 13,
2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/mone-
tary/20081013a.htm [perma.cc/7GGG-G92T].
158 ALLEN, supra note 123, at 113.
159 James Felkerson, $29,000,000,000,000:A Detailed Look at the Fed's
Bailout by Funding Facility and Recipient 11 (Levy Econ. Inst., Working
Paper No. 698, 2011), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp-698.pdf
[perma.cc/X6XW-ENM2].
160 For an overview of these other central bank swap networks, see AL-
LEN, supra note 123, at 86-98.
161 Id. at 114.
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many observers as one of the most important and effective pol-
icy responses to the financial crisis. 162 Yet it would be a mis-
take to conclude from this success that this bilateral swap net-
work represents a comprehensive and durable solution to
foreign currency liquidity problems. As described in the next
section, the design of these swap lines fails to counterbalance
the potentially significant distortions generated by this ambi-
tious form of state-sponsored liquidity insurance. The swap
lines also fail to create truly credible international commit-
ments, exposing the jurisdictions that rely on them to unpre-
dictable and self-interested decisions by foreign policymakers.
These shortcomings beg an important question: how might
policymakers design a more effective framework for the provi-
sion of FCLA? This question has taken on an added degree of
urgency in light of recent market developments. Since the be-
ginning of 2014, Eurodollar markets have experienced a num-
ber of episodes broadly resembling the U.S. dollar liquidity
shortage at the height of the financial crisis. 163 These episodes
have occurred in the context of a more general trend in terms
of the deterioration of conditions within U.S. dollar wholesale
funding markets. Figure 4 shows the cross-currency basis
swap spreads over 3-month LIBOR between the U.S. dollar
and each of the euro, pound sterling, and Japanese yen from
2005 to 2016. These spreads, which reflect the cost of borrow-
ing U.S. dollars using f/x swaps, are a useful barometer for
potential liquidity problems within wholesale funding mar-
kets.16 4
162 See ALLEN, supra note 123, at 117; Fleming & Klagge, supra note
145, at 7.
163 See Izabella Kaminska, All About the Eurodollars, Redux, FIN.
TIMES: ALPHAVILLE (Sept. 24, 2015, 3:18 AM), https://ftal-
phaville.ft.com/2015/09/24/2140580/all-about-the-eurodollars-redux/. See
also Izabella Kaminska, Petrodollars are Eurodollars, and Eurodollar Base
Money is Shrinking, FIN. TIMES: ALPHAVILLE (Jan. 25, 2016, 7:09 AM),
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/01/25/2151037/petrodollars-are-eurodol-
lars-and-eurodollar-base-money-is-shrinking/.
164 See Michael Chang & Carl Lantz, Credit Suisse Basis Points: Cross-
Currency Basis Swaps, CREDIT SUISSE (Apr. 19, 2013), https://credit-
suisse.com/researchandanalytics [perma.cclP2FV-ETPK].
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FIGURE 4: CROSS-CURRENCY BASIS SWAP SPREADS 165
Cross-currency basis swaps
As Figure 4 clearly illustrates, basis swap spreads between
the U.S. dollar and other major currencies have recently wid-
ened to levels last observed during the global financial crisis
and subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. 166 The grow-
ing stress within these markets has been attributed to several
factors, including: the sustained increase in the price of the
U.S. dollar relative to the euro, pound sterling, and other ma-
jor currencies over this period 6 7; the ECB's negative interest
165 Thomson Reuters (2016).
166 Although, the more gradual deterioration of market conditions from
2014 onward will have undoubtedly provided market participants with the
opportunity to more proactively address the resulting funding pressures by,
for example, reducing any f/x imbalances on their balance sheets.
167 See Hyun Song Shin, Econ. Advisor & Head of Research, Bank of
Int'l Settlements, Speech Presented at the World Bank Conference, The
State of Economics, the State of the World, Washington, DC: Global Liquid-
ity and Procyclicality, 2-5 (June 8, 2016),
http://www.bis.org/speeches/spl60608.htm [perma.cc/Q376-HFXB]. See
also Izabella Kaminska, Textbook Defying Global Dollar Shortages, FIN.
TIMES: ALPHAVILLE (June 9, 2016, 7:45 AM), https://ftal-
phaville.ft.com/2016/06/09/2 165690/textbook-defying-global-dollar-short-
ages/.
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rate policyl68; the introduction of comprehensive reforms tar-
geting U.S. money market funds 163 ; and programs such as the
Federal Reserve's new Term Deposit Facility that have had
the effect of incentivizing U.S. banks to repatriate short-term
dollar liquidity from abroad.1 69 Looking forward, this stress is
likely to intensify as the Fed raises interest rates from their
current historic lows and ramps up policies such as reverse
repo facilities designed to unwind quantitative easing and
thus absorb dollar liquidity from the international financial
system.1 7 0 The resulting withdrawal of short-term U.S. dollar
liquidity will inevitably put pressure on foreign banks, other
financial institutions, and commercial firms that rely on Eu-
rodollar markets.1 7 1
The existing central bank swap lines do little to constrain
the build-up of these foreign currency funding pressures.
There is also no guarantee, especially in light of the shifting
political winds in the United States, that the Federal Reserve
will intervene to support global U.S. dollar funding markets
during the next financial crisis-or that it will take into ac-
count the global repercussions of its own policy decisions in
potentially triggering this crisis. President Trump's vision for
'Making America Great Again' may not include the provision
of FCLA to foreign banks and other financial institutions.
These developments suggest that the foreign currency liquid-
ity crisis of 2007-2009 may provide us with a window into the
catalysts of future crises. They also frame why designing a
more effective framework for the provision of FCLA should be
168 See Izabella Kaminska, Eurodollars, FX Reserve Managers and the
Offshore RRP Issue, FIN. TIMES: ALPHAVILLE (Sept. 1, 2015, 5:39 AM),
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/09/01/2139085/eurodollars-fx-reserve-man-
agers-and-the-offshore-rrp-issue/.
169 See Izabella Kaminksa, All About the Eurodollars, FIN. TIMES: AL-
PHAVILLE (Sept. 5, 2014, 11:14 AM), https://ftal-
phaville.ft.com/2014/09/05/1957231/all-about-the-eurodollars/; Kaminska,
supra note 168.
170 See Kaminska, supra note 168.
171 Especially where these firms' balance sheets are characterized by
significant maturity and currency mismatches.
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viewed by policymakers as an important and pressing prior-
ity.
V. DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE FRAMEWORK FOR
FCLA
The turmoil of 2007-09 revealed an important fault line in
the structure of the global financial and economic system. On
one side of the divide is a global network of financial markets
and institutions characterized by high levels of integration
and interconnectedness, where financial institutions located
in one country can, with the stroke of a few keys create liabil-
ities denominated in the currency of another country, and
where these liabilities can grease the wheels of trade, finance,
and investment across every corner of the globe. On the other
side of the divide is an emerging, but still highly fragmented,
international monetary, regulatory, and crisis management
architecture, vulnerable to regulatory arbitrage, acute coordi-
nation problems, and conflicting domestic political prefer-
ences. As Benn Steil and Manuel Hinds observe, this divide
represents a significant threat to economic globalization: "If
anything is likely to throw globalization into reverse, it is not
trade itself, but the money that facilitates it. National monies
and global markets simply do not mix; together they make a
deadly brew of currency crises and geopolitical tension and
create ready pretexts for damaging protectionism."1 72
This Part examines some of the ways that one might begin
to bridge this divide by designing a more effective framework
for the provision of FCLA: one that reflects the imperatives of
Bagehot's Dictum while simultaneously constraining the
moral hazard and other problems generated by this ambitious
state-supported liquidity insurance. Broadly speaking, the
available policy alternatives include the introduction of a
blanket prohibition against the issuance of Eurodollar liabili-
ties, replacing the Eurodollar market with a global currency
and central bank, and strengthening the existing interna-
tional architecture for the provision of FCLA.
172 STEIL & HINDS, supra note 10, at 8.
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A. A Blanket Prohibition Against Eurodollar
Liabilities
As this Article has shown, scholars such as Morgan Ricks
see a clear relationship between private money creation, runs,
and financial instability.1 73 As Ricks observes, while deposit
guarantee schemes and ELA facilities have proven to be rela-
tively effective mechanisms for dampening the destabilizing
impact of private money creation within the conventional
banking system, the effectiveness of these mechanisms has
been eroded by the emergence and growth of a vibrant and
diverse shadow banking system.1 74 In response, Ricks pro-
poses a public-private partnership pursuant to which banks
would be licensed as the exclusive issuers of all deposits, short-
term liabilities, and other "money-claims."1 75 These money-
claims would be explicitly backed by a state guarantee,
thereby eliminating the distinction between public and pri-
vate money and, with it, the incentives of short-term creditors
to engage in destabilizing run-like behavior.1 76 In exchange,
the state would receive a periodic fee from each bank based on
the returns from its investment portfolio and the quantity of
its issued and outstanding money-claims.1 77 Banks would also
be subject to portfolio, capital, and other prudential regulatory
requirements designed to ameliorate any potential moral haz-
ard problems generated by the state guarantee.1 78
Ricks' proposal envisions that financial institutions other
than licensed banks would be prohibited from issuing deposit
173 See the discussion of Ricks' "money problem" in Part III, supra.
174 RicKs, supra note 79, at 215-19. As Ricks observes, deposit guaran-
tee schemes and ELA facilities also introduce potentially significant distor-
tions: encouraging growth in the size of financial institutions, the use of
leverage, and the oversupply of credit to the economy. Id. at 3.
175 Id. at 226, 235. Under Ricks proposal, banks would be licensed to
issue a specific quantity of money-claims. The system would then employ a
cap and trade system, enabling banks to sell excess capacity to other banks
with more attractive investment opportunities. Id. at 228.
176 Id. at 227, 241.
177 Id. at 226.
178 Id. at 225.
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liabilities and other money-claims. 179 Given the domestic lo-
cus of bank licensing regimes, one of the logical consequences
of this proposal would thus be the complete abolition of the
Eurodollar market. This is no accident. As Ricks explains:
"Simply put, the Eurodollar markets-and the Eurocurrency
markets more generally-are incompatible with financial sta-
bility". 180 Writing from the vantage point of the United States,
Ricks goes on to identify two possible avenues for abolishing
the Eurodollar market. The first avenue would be to impose a
blanket prohibition on the issuance of short-term U.S. dollar
liabilities by financial institutions incorporated and licensed
outside the United States. In pursuing this avenue, the
United States would find little support in public international
law. The IMF Articles of Agreement do not prohibit the use of
a currency issued by one member state as legal tender in an-
other member state.1 81 Similarly, while customary interna-
tional law recognizes the sovereignty of states over monetary
affairs, it does not provide a clear basis for incursions into the
monetary sovereignty of another state for the purpose of re-
stricting the use of foreign currencies. 182 What is more, nei-
ther the IMF Articles of Agreement nor customary interna-
tional law explicitly address the issue of private money
creation. 183 As a result, any prohibition would almost cer-
179 Id. at 226.
180 Id. at 239.
181 For the analysis of one former IMF general counsel on this point,
see Franqois Gianviti, Use of a Foreign Currency Under the IMF's Articles
of Agreement, in 3 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL
LAw 817 (2005).
182 LASTRA, supra note 7, at 17 ("With regard to the question of whether
the issuer of a currency may prohibit the use of its currency by another
country, there is at present no basis in international law to support the view
that the issuer may object to the currency being used by other countries.").
Consistent with this position, courts in the United States have explicitly
acknowledged the right of the U.S. government to designate foreign curren-
cies as legal tender without the consent of the issuing country. See Tyson v.
United States, 285 F.2d 19, 22 (10th Cir. 1960).
183 In this respect, the threat that a contract creating a Eurodollar lia-
bility may be invalidated under private international law-e.g., that the
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tainly need to take the form of unilateral restrictions on mar-
ket access: for example, denying foreign banks and other fi-
nancial institutions that issue Eurodollar liabilities (and their
affiliates) access to both the Federal Reserve's ELA and other
liquidity facilities, as well as the U.S. dollar clearing services
provided by domestic banks.1 84
In theory, a unilateral prohibition would serve to shift the
risk of foreign currency liquidity problems to the financial in-
stitutions that issued Eurodollar liabilities and, ultimately, to
the jurisdictions that permitted them to do so. In practice,
however, the impact of this unilateral prohibition is likely to
be relatively modest insofar as foreign institutions still en-
joyed access to U.S. dollar liquidity through international
wholesale funding and f/x swap markets. 185 Somewhat per-
versely, then, by increasing the reliance of foreign institutions
on these markets, restrictions on market access may only
serve to amplify the instability associated with widespread
market breakdown.
The second avenue would be to negotiate a multilateral
agreement pursuant to which signatory states agreed to pro-
hibit domestic financial institutions from issuing Eurodollar
liabilities.1 86 Where the signatories to this agreement include
the governments of other major international financial cen-
ters, this avenue would have the effect of bringing interna-
U.S. prohibition would be applied on an extraterritorial basis-may prove
more effective in disrupting the Eurodollar market. For a discussion of the
use of private international law as a mechanism for constraining interna-
tional regulatory arbitrage, see Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbi-
trage: A Conflicts of Law Approach, 47 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 63 (2014). -
184 See RICKS, supra note 79, at 239. In theory, of course, these market
access restrictions could be even broader: encompassing not only U.S. dollar
clearing services, but also restrictions on the ability to conduct any business
in U.S. markets or with U.S. clients.
185 Although the fact that these markets are prone to breakdown dur-
ing periods of widespread panic and instability would almost certainly con-
tribute to the build-up of risk within the remaining Eurodollar market.
186 RICKS, supra note 79, at 239-40.
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tional wholesale funding and f/x swap markets within the pe-
rimeter of this prohibition.1 87 Simultaneously, of course, a
multilateral agreement constraining the issuance of Eurodol-
lar liabilities may simply serve to drive these markets to other
(non-signatory) states. While Ricks views this multilateral av-
enue as more promising, the likelihood of reaching an agree-
ment-to say nothing of its effectiveness-would ultimately
hinge on the potential for this type of regulatory arbitrage and
the corresponding threat that the issuance of Eurodollar lia-
bilities outside the perimeter of the prohibition would under-
mine financial stability within signatory states.1 88
There is compelling logic in Ricks' argument that strength-
ening sovereign authority over private money creation would
yield significant benefits from the perspective of domestic fi-
nancial stability. A blanket prohibition against the issuance
of Eurodollar liabilities would shift responsibility for the pro-
vision of FCLA to the countries and financial institutions that
failed to comply with the prohibition, thereby strengthening
their incentives to more proactively address potential foreign
currency liquidity problems, and reducing potential moral
hazard problems. Restrictions on market access for foreign
banks and other institutions issuing Eurodollar liabilities
would also potentially help reduce-although almost certainly
not eliminate-the risk of cross-border contagion stemming
from the materialization of foreign currency liquidity prob-
lems.
Ultimately, however, these domestic benefits must be
weighed against the wider implications of abolishing the Eu-
rodollar market. As this Article has described, a significant
187 An agreement covering the United States, European Union, United
Kingdom, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan, for example; would cover the
vast majority of transactions within the f/x swap market. See Bank of Int'l
Settlements, Turnover of OTC Foreign Exchange Instruments, by Country
(Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.bis.org/statistics/dll_2.pdf [perma.cc/EK3Q-
JEHY].
188 As discussed in greater detail in Section V.C, any agreement would
also likely need to be accompanied by credible restrictions on market access
targeting financial institutions incorporated and licensed to carry on busi-
ness in non-signatory states.
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proportion of international trade outside the United States is
invoiced and settled in U.S. dollars. This trade is often sup-
ported by short-term U.S. dollar trade financing provided by
foreign banks and other financial institutions. 189 Foreign fi-
nancial institutions are also important participants in inter-
national U.S. dollar-denominated wholesale funding and f/x
swap markets. The funding obtained in these markets is then
often used to support U.S. dollar loans and other invest-
ments. 190 The elimination of the Eurodollar market would
thus necessitate a significant restructuring of many of the
markets and institutions at the heart of the global financial
and economic system. While this restructuring may ulti-
mately represent a transitional problem, it is a problem that
may nevertheless trigger significant economic disruption and
financial instability.
While it is obviously difficult to predict precisely how this
restructuring would unfold, two possible scenarios stand out.
These scenarios are not mutually exclusive, and may even
play out in parallel with one another.191 In the first scenario,
large numbers of foreign banks might seek to obtain banking
licenses in the United States in order to ensure their contin-
ued ability to issue U.S. dollar denominated money-claims.
The net effect of this migration would thus be to bring the Eu-
rodollar market back 'onshore'. It would also create an enor-
mous concentration of financial and economic activity in one
country, further entrenching the United States as the de facto
189 While Ricks excludes "trade credit" from his definition of a money-
claim, this must be distinguished from trade financing arrangements such
as letters of credit, supply chain finance, or factoring. Whereas trade credit
effectively refers to the ability to purchase goods on credit and the resulting
creation of short-term inter-firm liabilities generally referred to as "ac-
counts payable," trade financing generally involves the extension of loans,
guarantees, or other short-term liabilities by third party financial institu-
tions for the purpose of facilitating international trade. That Ricks' excep-
tion only extends to these narrow inter-firm liabilities is apparent from his
proposed statutory language. Id. at 244.
190 Without access to these markets, foreign financial institutions hold-
ing U.S. dollar assets would face significant foreign exchange risk.
191 Although it is likely that gravitation toward either extreme would
be the most likely to engender pronounced instability.
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global lender of last resort and increasing the exposure of the
rest of the world to its fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policy
decisions.1 92 Strengthening the monetary sovereignty of the
United States would thus come at the expense of the policy
sovereignty of other countries.
In the second scenario, firms might switch from the U.S.
dollar to other currencies for the purposes of international
trade, finance, and investment. The resulting fragmentation
of the currency composition of these business activities would
likely precipitate an increase in financing and trading costs
and create an impediment to global economic integration. Im-
portantly, the existence of winners and losers under both of
these scenarios renders the prospects of a binding multilateral
agreement to dismantle the Eurodollar market decidedly
bleak. At the same time, any unilateral action would risk pro-
voking retaliatory action from other states. Moreover, under
either scenario there is a significant risk that the restructur-
ing process may unfold in a disorderly fashion. Viewed from
this perspective, the practical effect of Ricks' proposal may
simply be to undermine financial and economic globalization
and export financial instability from the United States to the
rest of the world.
B. A Global Currency and Central Bank
Ricks' proposal to dismantle the Eurodollar market envi-
sions the vigorous assertion of the state's sovereign authority
over private money creation. Other, even more radical, pro-
posals envision the transfer of this authority to international
institutions. Proposals for an international monetary author-
ity and currency have a long and colorful history. Perhaps the
most (in)famous proposal is John Maynard Keynes' scheme for
192 Thereby further intensifying the global financial cycle. See H616ne
Rey, Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Pol-
icy Independence, FED. RES. BANK KANSAS CITY (2013), https://www.kansas-
cityfed.org/hgiSo/publicat/sympos/2013/2013Rey.pdf [perma.cc/47G7-
Y6BT].
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the creation of an 'international clearing union.'1 93 Advanced
by Keynes at the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944, the
international clearing union was designed to prevent the
build-up of destabilizing international trade imbalances
through a multilateral system of debits and credits denomi-
nated in a new unit of account known as 'bancor.'1 94 Recently,
scholars such as Robert Hockett have returned to Keynes'
original proposal and advocated it as the basis for the creation
of a global currency and central bank.195 While the institu-
tional details of these proposals vary, they generally involve
the creation of a new currency, issued and managed by an in-
ternational monetary authority, and intended for use along-
side existing domestic and supranational currencies. 196
The benefits of a global currency are typically framed as
flowing from the potential to create a global 'risk-free' asset,
193 See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, ACTIVITIES 1940-1944: SHAPING THE
POST-WAR WORLD: THE CLEARING UNION (1980), reprinted in 25 THE COL-
LECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES (Donald Moggridge ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 1980).
194 See id. for further details regarding Keynes' scheme as originally
proposed. The scheme encountered significant resistance at the Bretton
Woods conference, especially from the United States, and was abandoned in
favor of what would eventually become the IMF.
195 Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0: A Constructive Retrieval for Sus-
tainable Finance, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y. 401 (2013). See also EM-
MANUEL FARHI ET AL., REFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
31-49 (2011).
196 At the same time, not all proposals envision the creation of a new
currency. See FARHI ET AL., supra note 195. A related, if somewhat more
modest, proposal is to promote the use of the Special Drawing Rights
("SDRs") issued by the IMF in international commercial transactions. For a
recent synthesis of the main arguments for and against the expanded use of
SDRs in international commercial transactions, see IMF, Enhancing Inter-
national Monetary Stability-A Role for the SDR? (Jan. 7, 2011),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/010711.pdf [perma.cc/8GAV-
J9UH]. More ambitious proposals, meanwhile, envision that an interna-
tional currency could eventually replace existing national currencies in the
same way that the euro did for euro area member states.
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reduce exchange rate volatility, and moderate the destabiliz-
ing impact of global trade imbalances.1 97 In theory, however,
the creation of a global currency and central bank could also
help address foreign currency liquidity problems. The promise
of an international currency-let's call it 'bancor' in honor of
Keynes1 98-from this perspective resides in the ability of a
new international monetary authority ("IMA") to effectively
consolidate authority for monetary policy, the licensing and
prudential regulation of financial institutions engaged in pri-
vate money creation, and the access of these institutions to
FCLA. The logical starting point would be for signatory states
to confer upon the IMA clear authority over all matters relat-
ing to the issuance of short-term liabilities denominated in
bancor. Banks and other financial institutions licensed to
carry on business in these jurisdictions would then be re-
quired to apply to the IMA for an additional license to be able
to issue short-term bancor denominated liabilities.1 99 This li-
cense would then be granted on the condition that financial
institutions comply with a limited range of targeted pruden-
tial requirements-e.g., currency- specific portfolio, capital,
and liquidity constraints-designed to eliminate the prospect
197 See, e.g., Mark Carney, then Governor of the Bank of Can., Remarks
at the Spruce Meadows Changing Fortunes Round Table, Calgary, Alberta:
Restoring Faith in the International Monetary System (Sept. 10, 2010),
http://www.bis.org/review/r100916a.pdf [perma.cc/ZG7U-EWM7].
198 And in honor of the tradition of naming hypothetical international
currencies 'bancor' in honor of Keynes. See e.g., Hockett, supra note 195, at
480.
199 Notably, direct supervisory authority over domestic financial insti-
tutions is not a feature of most proposals for the creation of an IMA and
currency. One possible alternative would be for signatory states to retain
supervisory authority under the oversight of an IMA. This oversight author-
ity would then need to be coupled with a credible mechanism for imposing
costs on signatory states that failed to (i) adopt adequate prudential regu-
lation and supervision in connection with bancor denominated assets and
short-term liabilities or (ii) take action to prevent large foreign exchange
imbalances within their domestic banking systems.
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of regulatory arbitrage and other distortions. 200 Financial in-
stitutions would also be required to provide the INA with in-
formation about their bancor denominated assets and liabili-
ties on an ongoing basis.201 Where these institutions
experienced temporary liquidity problems, the IIA would
then stand ready to provide bancor loans collateralized
against high quality bancor denominated assets on terms
that-reflecting Bagehot's dictum-minimized potential
moral hazard problems. By more firmly tethering monetary
and regulatory authority, the creation of an international cur-
rency and central bank could thus eliminate some of the fric-
tions that currently undermine the ability of domestic policy-
makers to monitor the build-up of the risks associated with
private money creation, impose consistent and effective regu-
latory constraints across jurisdictions and institutions, and
respond in a more timely and comprehensive fashion to inter-
national financial crises.
It would be an understatement to say that there are a num-
ber of significant obstacles to the creation and successful adop-
tion of an international currency and central bank. The first
obstacle would likely be to satisfy policymakers that the global
economy represented what economists refer to as an "optimal
currency area."20 2 Whether a particular economic region con-
stitutes an optimal currency area is a function of a number of
factors. These factors include: the volume of cross-border
trade between the countries within the region; existing barri-
ers to the free movement of goods, labour, and other factors of
production between these countries; the degree of homogene-
200 In order to minimize unnecessary divergence or duplication, these
requirements could be linked to the capital adequacy and liquidity rules
produced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). See BA-
SEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYs. (2011),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf [perma.cc/382V-BRCH].
201 The type of information that could be provided, and the uses to
which it might be put, are examined in greater detail in Section V.C.
202 See Robert A. Mundell, A Theory of Optimal Currency Areas, 51 AM.
ECON. REV. 657 (1961).
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ity in the economic structure and business cycles of the indus-
tries within these countries and; any differences in the vola-
tility of prices across the region. 203 The higher the level of eco-
nomic integration and homogeneity, the more likely it is that
a region will represent an optimal currency area. At the heart
of this determination is then a tradeoff between the antici-
pated reduction in transaction costs and uncertainty associ-
ated with a currency union versus the constraints that this
union imposes on the ability of domestic policymakers to ad-
just to idiosyncratic shocks through changes in domestic in-
terest and exchange rates. 204
The concept of an optimal currency area is far from perfect.
Amongst other problems, the type of static and homogeneous
economic regions that are most likely to represent optimal
currency areas are-for the very same reasons-likely to suf-
fer from sclerotic growth and innovation and inefficient and
potentially destabilizing under-diversification. 205 Neverthe-
less, even a cursory examination of the factors that determine
whether a region constitutes an optimal currency area sug-
gests that-as a threshold matter-the economic case for the
creation of an international currency is far from clear cut.
The second challenge would be the naked political one that
Keynes himself encountered at Bretton Woods.206 How does
one persuade sovereign countries-and especially countries
203 For a synthesis of these variables, see PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE
OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY & POLICY, 558-72 (7th ed.
2006). See also STEIL & HINDS, supra note 10, at 138-45.
204 Maurice Obstfeld, Professor of Econ., U. of Cal. Berkeley, Paul Mas-
son, Senior Advisor, IMF Res. Dep't, Robert Mundell, 1999 Nobel Laureate
and Professor of Econ., Colum. U., Remarks at the IMF Economic Forum-
One World, One Currency: Destination or Delusion? (Nov. 8, 2000),
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/54/trOO1108
[perma.cc/PG5P-E6C5].
205 See STEIL & HINDS, supra note 10, at 141-45 for a more detailed
overview of some of the theoretical problems associated with the concept of
an optimal currency area.
206 For an excellent account of Keynes' experience at the Bretton Woods
conference, see BENN STEIL, THE BATTLE OF BRETTON WOODS: JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, HARRY DEXTER WHITE, AND THE MAKING OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER
(2013).
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that derive substantial benefits from the existing interna-
tional system-to transfer authority over an important area
of economic affairs to an international institution? This chal-
lenge would inevitably be compounded by thorny issues of in-
stitutional design. What sort of constraints would need to be
imposed on domestic trade, fiscal, and monetary policy in or-
der to make the new currency credible? How would the bur-
dens of ELA be distributed between countries? And how would
senior positions within the IMA be filled? These and other
questions would all need to be answered in a way that per-
suaded the largest number of countries-representing the
largest possible proportion of global trade, finance, and invest-
ment-to agree to the creation of a new international cur-
rency. As demonstrated by the European Union's ongoing ex-
periment with the single currency, failing to properly address
these issues at the outset could undermine the new currency's
long-term credibility.
The third and fundamentally intertwined challenge would
be how to make a new international currency attractive to a
critical mass of financial and commercial counterparties. Cur-
rencies are often viewed as classic 'network' goods. 207 In a nut-
shell, where a currency reaches a threshold level of use within
a given market, it starts to develop its own gravity: with users
attracted not only by the currency's intrinsic value, but also
by the fact that it is widely used. The path dependency created
by these network effects is reflected in a form of 'stickiness'-
entrenching incumbent currencies and erecting a significant
barrier to the emergence and widespread adoption of potential
207 See Paul Krugman, Vehicle Currencies and the Structure of Interna-
tional Exchange, 12 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 513 (1980); Paul
Krugman, The International Role of the Dollar: Theory and Prospects, in
EXCHANGE RATE THEORY AND PRACTICE (1984); Kiminori Matsuyama et al.,
Toward a Theory of International Currency, 60 REV. ECON. STUD. 283 (1993);
PHILIPP HARTMANN, CURRENCY COMPETITION AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE MAR-
KETS: THE DOLLAR, THE YEN AND THE EURO (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998);
H616ne Rey, International Trade and Currency Exchange, 68 REV. ECON.
STUD. 443 (2001); Swoboda, supra note 26. For an alternative perspective,
see generally Livia Chitu et al., When Did the Dollar Overtake Sterling as
the Leading International Currency? Evidence from the Bond Markets (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18097, 2012).
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substitutes. We might expect these network effects to be par-
ticularly pronounced in the case of an international currency
given that one of the most frequently cited intrinsic benefits-
relatively low exchange rate volatility-is itself partly a func-
tion of the depth and volume of the market for the currency
itself. Accordingly, even if public policymakers were able to
surmount the political obstacles to the creation of an interna-
tional currency, there would remain the sticky problem of how
to attract private market participants away from the U.S. dol-
lar and other major international currencies. 208
Finally, the introduction of an international currency
would throw up a host of technocratic policy challenges. One
of the most important of these challenges would be how to co-
ordinate the monetary policy of the IMA with the policies of
signatory states. There would also be the challenge of ensur-
ing that the introduction of an international currency was not
itself a source of financial instability. As the ECB has warned,
there may be significant "unintended consequenceS" 209 associ-
ated with "replacing international currencies that have estab-
lished themselves as a result of the autonomous decisions of
private and official agents with a synthetic, policy-imposed,
international currency." 210 Given these challenges, the crea-
tion and widespread adoption of a new international currency
seems both highly unlikely and potentially undesirable.
C. Reform of Existing Institutional Arrangements for
FCLA
The third and final strategy is to strengthen existing inter-
national arrangements for the provision of FCLA. Two sets of
208 Thereafter, there would also be the problem of maintaining the cur-
rency's attractiveness-with any failure to do so potentially precipitating a
flight (back) to other currencies.
209 Ettore Dorrucci & Julie McKay, The International Monetary System
After the Financial Crisis, OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES (Eur. Cent. Bank,
Frankfurt, Ger.), Feb. 2011, at 35.
210 Id.
997
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
arrangements stand out as particularly promising and, simul-
taneously, ripe for potential reform. 2 11 The first is the network
of bilateral central bank swap lines established in response to
the financial crisis. The first generation of swap lines estab-
lished between the Federal Reserve and other central banks
expired in February 2010.212 Within a matter of months, how-
ever, the deterioration of wholesale funding markets precipi-
tated by the European sovereign debt crisis prompted the Fed
to re-establish temporary swap lines with the ECB, SNB,
Bank of England, Bank of Japan, and Bank of Canada. 2 13 In
October 2013, the Fed announced that these temporary swap
lines would be converted into standing facilities enabling any
of the six central banks to borrow an unlimited amount of any
of the currencies issued by the other participating central
banks. As the Fed explained in its announcement:
The conversion of these liquidity lines with pre-set ex-
piration dates to standing lines further supports fi-
nancial stability by reducing uncertainties among
211 There are a number of other-predominantly regional-arrange-
ments for the provision of FCLA. These include the Chiang Mai Multilateral
Mechanism administered by the ASEAN group of countries. These arrange-
ments are also potentially important and, arguably, in need of reform. The
focus of this paper on the network of central bank swap lines and IMF emer-
gency lending facilities reflects the potential impact of these arrangements
at this point in time. The swap lines and IMF lending facilities are also
unique insofar as they benefit from the direct participation of the United
States as issuer of the world's most widely used reserve currency.
212 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., FOMC State-
ment (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/mon-
etary/20100127a.htm [perma.cc/G8K4-T2RN].
213 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., FOMC State-
ment: Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of Canada, Bank of
England, and Swiss National Bank Announce Reestablishment of Tempo-
rary U.S. Dollar Liquidity Swap Facilities (May 9, 2010), https://www.fed-
eralreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20100509a.htm
[perma.cc/HDN8-6SJZ]; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res.
Sys., FOMC Statement: FOMC Authorizes Re-establishment of Temporary
U.S. Dollar Liquidity Swap Arrangement with the Bank of Japan (May 10,
2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/mone-
tary20100510a.htm [perma.ccW562-9V73].
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market participants as to whether and when these ar-
rangements would be renewed. This action results
from the ongoing cooperation among these central
banks to help maintain financial stability and confi-
dence in global funding markets. 2 14
What began as a somewhat ad hoc response to the financial
crisis has thus rather quietly metamorphosized into an im-
portant-and seemingly permanent-feature of the global fi-
nancial crisis management architecture.
The standing swap facilities announced in October 2013
are enshrined in a series of bilateral agreements between each
of the participating central banks. 2 15 These agreements share
several important features. The first is that the extension of
FCLA under these agreements is highly contingent on domes-
tic legal and political considerations. The wording of these
agreements strongly suggests that swap transactions will only
be approved and executed upon the mutual agreement of both
parties at the time one of them actually requests FCLA.216
The extension of FCLA must also be consistent with the stat-
utory mandates of the relevant central banks. These require-
ments are in all likelihood linked; the contingent nature of the
commitment is ultimately a reflection of the need to ensure
that any given swap transaction falls squarely within the
scope of the central bank's legal authority. Perhaps not sur-
214 Frequently Asked Questions: Standing Lines for U.S. Dollar and
Foreign Currency Liquidity Swaps, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. REs. SYS.,
(Oct. 2013), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst swap-
faqs.htm.
215 The agreements among the Fed and participating central banks are
available at Central Bank Liquidity Swaps, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/liquidity-swap.html
[perma.cc/8JKM-L5GY].
216 See e.g., U.S. Dollar-British Pounds Swap Agreement, FED. RES.
BANK OF N.Y. (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org/mediali-
brary/media/markets/USDPound-swap-agreement.pdf [perma.ccl2533-
UWW3]. Section 1(c) of this agreement begins: "The Parties agree, at such
times as they mutually agree, to enter into Swap Transactions . . ." (empha-
sis added).
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prisingly, however, these mandates rarely make explicit ref-
erence to the promotion of monetary or financial stability in
other countries.
In the United States, for example, the statutory authority
of the Fed to enter into these swap transactions is provided by
section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act. 217 Section 14 authorizes
each of the twelve regional Federal Reserve banks to purchase
and sell foreign currencies as a part of the Fed's open market
operations. 218 While this might appear to give the Fed a wide
berth, these transactions must still be consistent with its
wider mandate to promote maximum employment, stable
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.219 This man-
date has been interpreted by senior Fed officials as implicitly
encompassing the promotion of financial stability.220 Con-
sistent with this interpretation, the Fed has signaled that
217 Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 226 (1913).
218 Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act states: "Any Federal reserve
bank may, under rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, purchase and sell in the open market,
at home or abroad, either from or to domestic or foreign banks, firms, cor-
porations, or individuals, cable transfers" (emphasis added). Written in
1913, the reference to "cable transfers" is in fact a reference to foreign cur-
rencies. Section 14(e), meanwhile, permits any Federal reserve bank to:
[Olpen and maintain accounts in foreign countries, appoint corre-
spondents, and establish agencies in such countries wheresoever
[sic] it may be deemed best for the purpose of purchasing, selling,
and collecting bills of exchange, and to buy and sell, with or with-
out its indorsement [sic], through such correspondents or agen-
cies, bills of exchange (or acceptances) arising out of actual com-
mercial transactions which have not more than ninety days to
run... and... to open and maintain banking accounts for such for-
eign correspondents or agencies, or for foreign banks or bankers,
or for foreign states....
Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 358 (1913).
219 See Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2A (1913).
220 See e.g., Tom Baxter, Exec. Vice President and Gen. Counsel of the
Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the Future of Banking Regulation and
Supervision in the EU Conference, Frankfurt, Germany: Financial Stabil-
ity: The Role of the Federal Reserve System (Nov. 15, 2013),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/baxl31120
[perma.cclJ6TU-AL4X].
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swap transactions under these facilities will generally be ap-
proved only where they are "directed at countering disorderly
market conditions." 22 1 The Fed has also produced a video,
bluntly titled "Why Swap Lines are in the U.S. National In-
terest," explaining how the facilities support investment, em-
ployment, and economic growth in the United States. 22 2 In
light of these and other similar statements, it seems likely
that swap transactions will only be approved where there is a
clear and present danger to the financial stability of the juris-
diction that has received a request for FCLA.223 Where there
exists no such threat, or where providing liquidity assistance
to foreign financial institutions might prove politically costly,
the structure of these agreements-to say nothing of the ab-
sence of a generally agreed upon definition of 'financial stabil-
ity'-gives participating central banks significant discretion
to decline a request for FCLA.
The second important feature of these swap agreements is
the complete absence of both ex ante qualifications for partic-
ipating jurisdictions and ex post constraints on the extension
of FCLA to eligible financial institutions. The Federal Reserve
has ostensibly selected participating jurisdictions on the basis
of its own evaluation of the potential threat that these juris-
dictions pose to the financial stability of the United States. 224
221 Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee Meeting, FED. RES.
BANK N.Y. 6 (Jan. 28-29, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetary-
policy/fomcminutes20140129.htm [perma.cc/CJ9J-6LXD].
222 See Protecting the U.S. Economy from Strains Abroad-Why Swap
Lines Are in the U.S. National Interest, FED. RES. BANK N.Y.
https://www.newyorkfed.org/education/liqswap.html [perma.cc/WN9K-
PXB8].
223 See Denbee et al., supra note 51, at 11 (observing, "the scope of swap
line liquidity provision is very narrow, and typically limited to facilitating
market-wide liquidity provision to cross-border banks for the purposes of
domestic financial stability").
224 See e.g., Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on October
28-29, 2008, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. 10-11, 32-35 (Oct, 28-29 2008),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20081029meet-
ing.pdf [perma.cc/4NZV-H736] (emphasizing the size of a country's econ-
omy, its structural interconnectedness with the global financial system, and
whether it is a major financial center as important factors in determining
1001
While this approach is broadly understandable, the absence of
more formal and objective ex ante qualifications has also re-
sulted in at least one questionable inclusion (Canada) and one
glaring omission (China). For participating jurisdictions,
meanwhile, the swap agreements do not impose any limits
around the types of financial institutions to which recipient
central banks can supply foreign currency funding. Nor do
these agreements in any way dictate the terms upon which
this funding will be made available to these institutions. Per-
haps most importantly, the agreements do not prescribe that
FCLA be provided against good quality collateral, at a penalty
rate of interest, and only to fundamentally solvent but tempo-
rarily illiquid banks and other financial institutions.
Central banks in receipt of FCLA are also under no obliga-
tion to ensure that the prudential regulatory requirements
imposed on eligible financial institutions are functionally
equivalent to those imposed on financial institutions in the ju-
risdiction that provides this assistance. While some observers
have argued that the BCBS capital and liquidity standards
ensure a sufficient degree of regulatory and supervisory har-
monization, the implementation of these standards varies
from country to country. There are also signs that the Basel
consensus is beginning to fray around the edges, with the Eu-
ropean Union having recently been determined by the BIS to
be in material non-compliance with Basel standards. 225 The
absence of ex ante qualifications and ex post constraints thus
introduces the prospect that FCLA may in some cases be
available to a wider range of financial institutions, on more
whether to extend swap lines to Brazil, Singapore, Mexico, Korea, and Ice-
land).
225 See RCAP on Consistency: Jurisdictional Assessments, BANK FOR
INT'L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcapjurisdic-
tional.htm [perma.cc/Q8SQ-M3G7]. See also Silla Brush et al., Bank Regu-
lators Face Santiago Showdown on Capital Reform, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17,
2016, 7:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-
18/bank-regulators-stare-across-capital-divide-in-santiago-showdown
[perma.cc/P5XE-AQCV]; Alex Barker, Jim Brunsden, & Martin Arnold, EU
to Retaliate Against US Bank Capital Rules, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/26078750-b003-11e6-a37c-f4aOlflbOfal.
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favorable terms, and subject to less onerous regulatory con-
straints, than in the jurisdiction that actually issues the rele-
vant currency.
Closely tied to the absence of qualifications and conditions
is the contemplated fee structure of the swap transactions.
There are at least two ways to view the economic function of
the standing facilities. The first is as a line of credit. Unlike
most privately negotiated lines of credit, 2 26 however, central
banks with access to the swap lines are not charged a 'com-
mitment fee' in exchange for the option of obtaining FCLA.
Instead, central banks accessing this liquidity support are
simply charged interest on any outstanding balance. This in-
terest is calculated on the basis of a spread above a benchmark
short-term interest rate such as the overnight index swap
("OIS") rate.2 27 While comprehensive data is not available, the
reported spreads on swap transactions under the temporary
swap lines in operation between 2007 and 2013 ranged from
50-100 basis points (0.5-1.0%) above the OIS rate.22 8
The second way to view the facilities is as a form of insur-
ance against currency-specific liquidity problems. Notably,
however, there is no evidence that the methodology for calcu-
lating interest reflects the value of this insurance to partici-
pating central banks on the basis of, for example, the out-
standing stock of the relevant currency, its use by financial
institutions within the relevant jurisdiction, or the probability
of a market wide currency-specific liquidity shortage. As the
Bank of England has observed, the swap transactions are in-
stead priced "at a cost which is not attractive during normal
226 And, as this Article shall discuss, the IMF's new emergency lending
facilities.
227 See e.g., U.S. Dollar-British Pounds Swap Agreement, supra note
216, § 4(c).
228 Experience with Foreign Currency Liquidity Providing Central
Bank Swaps, MONTHLY BULL. (Eur. Cent. Bank, Frankfurt, Ger.), Aug.
2014, at 73, 65-82; Denbee et al., supra note 51, at 12.
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periods, but is not prohibitively expensive during crisis peri-
ods." 22 9 Whichever view one adopts, it thus seems highly prob-
able that the current fee structure of the standing facilities
will result in significant underpricing of FCLA.
The final feature relates to the contemplated term struc-
ture of the swap transactions. The agreements state that each
swap will have a maximum maturity of eighty-eight days, or
such other period as may be mutually agreed by the parties.23 0
However, in the event that one of the parties fails to repur-
chase its currency on or before the relevant maturity date, the
swap transaction automatically rolls over into a new over-
night swap transaction. 23 1 The amount owing under the ma-
turing swap is then cancelled and replaced with this rollover
swap transaction, which for the purposes of the agreements is
expressly deemed to be equivalent to a newly entered-into
swap transaction. 232 As a result, should the party also fail to
repurchase its currency upon the maturity of a rollover swap
transaction, the swap will once again automatically rollover.
In theory, therefore, these swap transactions could roll over in
perpetuity. 2 33
These features reveal two critical flaws in the design of the
standing facilities. The first is the complete absence of mech-
anisms designed to constrain the potentially significant moral
hazard problems generated by the theoretically open-ended,
underpriced provision of FCLA. In the absence of such mech-
anisms, participating central banks may come to expect that
they will be able to acquire foreign currency under these facil-
ities at any time and on favorable terms-thereby undercut-
ting their incentives to strictly regulate the issuance of short-
229 Denbee et al., supra note 51, at 11.
230 See, e.g., U.S. Dollar-British Pounds Swap Agreement, supra note
216, § 1(c).
231 Id. § 6(a).
232 Id.
233 While the party providing FCLA under the swap is authorized to set
off any obligations it owes against the corresponding currency purchased
from the other party, id. § 6(b), one might expect this right to be exercised
in only the most extraordinary of circumstances given the potential political
ramifications of exercising this option.
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term foreign currency liabilities by domestic financial institu-
tions or proactively manage the risk of foreign currency liquid-
ity problems. These financial institutions, in turn, may main-
tain-or even increase-their short-term foreign currency
borrowing with the expectation that the central bank will step
in to provide FCLA during periods of widespread market dis-
ruption. In this important respect, the incomplete institution-
alization of FCLA under the standing facilities may actually
serve to foment potential financial instability.
The second flaw resides in the politically contingent nature
of the standing facilities. Some view this flaw as necessary to
ensure that participating central banks are not ex ante com-
mitted to provide FCLA in circumstances that would fall out-
side the scope of their statutory authority. 234 Some even view
it as desirable insofar as it introduces a degree of constructive
ambiguity, thereby helping to ameliorate potential moral haz-
ard problems. 23 5 Ultimately, however-and irrespective of
whether we view it as a 'feature' or a 'bug'-the contingent
nature of the facilities generates two potentially significant
distortions. First, one might expect both participating central
banks and the financial institutions under their oversight to
respond to any uncertainty around their access to the facilities
by expanding their foreign currency assets and liabilities and,
more generally, by increasing their levels of integration and
interconnectedness with the financial systems and real econ-
omies in other participating jurisdictions. By doing so, these
central banks and financial institutions would seek to in-
crease the likelihood that any domestic instability would spill
over into other participating jurisdictions, thereby maximiz-
ing the probability that these jurisdictions would deem it in
their economic best interests to provide FCLA. Second, the po-
litically contingent nature of the facilities opens the door to
decisions regarding access to foreign currency liquidity that
are motivated by domestic political and other considerations.
As the history of financial crises clearly demonstrates, these
234 See, e.g., Eur. Cent. Bank, supra note 228, at 37.
235 Id. at 82.
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decisions often come into conflict with the objective of promot-
ing global financial stability. 236
The question thus becomes how to make the standing fa-
cilities more credible and effective sources of FCLA. The first
step would be to place access to the standing facilities on more
certain legal footing. Some observers have gone as far as sug-
gesting that the mandate of the Federal Reserve should be for-
mally amended to reflect its de facto role as global lender of
last resort.2 37 A related, and ultimately complementary, pro-
posal would be to introduce formal, binding, ex ante qualifica-
tions for jurisdictions seeking access to FCLA. These qualifi-
cations could reflect the size of a jurisdiction's domestic
economy, its structural interconnectedness with the global fi-
nancial system, whether it was a major international financial
center, and whether it otherwise posed a threat to the finan-
cial stability of the jurisdiction providing FCLA.238 Once qual-
ified, the extension of FCLA to these jurisdictions could then
be made contingent on observable and objective metrics of
market disruption or financial instability. Potentially useful
metrics include basis swap spreads (which, as we have seen,
are a barometer for foreign currency funding pressures) and
the LIBOR-OIS spread (a key barometer of perceptions of
counterparty credit risk within wholesale funding markets).
Where these spreads exceed specified thresholds, this could be
236 For examples from the 1920s and 1930s, see LIAQUAT AHAMED,
LORDS OF FINANCE: THE BANKERS WHO BROKE THE WORLD (2009). Over its
history, even the Federal Reserve has not been immune to oscillations in its
approach towards the maintenance of international financial stability. See
Peter Conti-Brown & David Zaring, Foreign Affairs and the Federal Reserve,
(American Soc'y of Int'l Law Int'l Econ. Law, Working Paper, 2016) (on file
with author) (describing the Fed's oscillation between a "cosmopolitan" and
"isolationist" approach to foreign affairs).
237 See STEIL & HINDS, supra note 10, at 246 ('The best hope for salvag-
ing financial globalization, then, is a renewed statutory framework for the
Fed, one which explicitly acknowledges the global role of the dollar and the
dependence of the U.S. economy on foreign confidence in it.").
238 These factors were notably taken into consideration by the Federal
Open Market Committee in determining which jurisdictions would receive
central bank swap lines during the crisis. See Minutes of the Federal Open
Market Committee Meeting, supra note 224, at 10.
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deemed to constitute evidence of financial instability, thereby
enabling the Fed and other participating central banks to ex-
tend FCLA in accordance with their statutory mandates.
In exchange for this more certain commitment to provide
FCLA, the second step would be to require qualifying jurisdic-
tions to agree to a binding framework governing the terms
upon which FCLA would be extended to domestic banks and
other financial institutions. The framework could articulate,
for example, which types of financial institutions would be el-
igible to receive FCLA, the categories of collateral that could
be pledged, and the haircuts imposed on each category of col-
lateral. Qualifying jurisdictions could also undertake to en-
sure that short-term foreign currency liabilities issued by do-
mestic financial institutions were subject to the same reserve
ratios as the equivalent liabilities in the jurisdiction that is-
sued the relevant currency. They could also agree to impose
currency-specific liquidity coverage ratios designed to ensure
that domestic financial institutions held a sufficient stock of
high quality liquid assets denominated in the relevant cur-
rency to be able to meet expected outflows in the event of a
hypothetical thirty-day stress scenario. 23 9 The primary thrust
of these requirements would be to eliminate the distortions
created by substantive differences in ELA and prudential reg-
ulatory regimes across jurisdictions, constrain the build-up of
foreign currency mismatches, and alleviate the pressure on fi-
nancial institutions to sell foreign currency assets during pe-
riods of market disruption. 240
The third step would be to introduce a fee structure that
better reflected the role of the standing facilities as a form of
liquidity insurance. The role of FCLA as a form of insurance
239 Indeed, the European Systemic Risk Board has encouraged the com-
petent authorities within EU member states to monitor liquidity risks asso-
ciated with foreign currency assets and liabilities. See Recommendation of
the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on US Dollar De-
nominated Funding of Credit Institutions, 2011 O.J. (C 72) 1, 2.
240 See Jeremy C. Stein, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Remarks at the Global Research Forum, Int'l Finance and Macroeco-
nomics: Dollar Funding and Global Banks (Dec. 17, 2012); Denbee et al.,
supra note 51, at 25.
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suggests that all qualifying jurisdictions should be required to
pay an ongoing fee-a premium-irrespective of whether they
actually draw down on the facilities. This premium would the-
oretically need to reflect the use of the relevant currency
within the domestic economy of a qualifying jurisdiction, the
level and proportion of short-term foreign currency funding
within its domestic financial system, and any pronounced for-
eign currency mismatches on the balance sheets of domestic
banks and other financial institutions. It would also need to
reflect any other forms of (self-)insurance-e.g., the accumu-
lation of foreign exchange reserves-undertaken by a qualify-
ing jurisdiction for the purpose of insulating the domestic fi-
nancial system from foreign currency liquidity problems.
While accurately pricing this type of insurance is notoriously
difficult, some reasonable attempt at doing so is ultimately
necessary in order to constrain the moral hazard problems
stemming from the underpriced provision of FCLA under the
current standing facilities.
Finally, the standing facilities would need to be augmented
by binding commitments on the part of qualifying jurisdic-
tions to share data relating to foreign currency assets and lia-
bilities within their domestic financial systems. This data
sharing would be vital for the purposes of both monitoring
compliance with ex ante qualifications and ex post constraints
and calculating the requisite liquidity insurance premiums.
More generally, enhanced data sharing would also enable
more effective macroprudential surveillance-especially with
respect to cross-border capital flows and the build-up of poten-
tially destabilizing foreign exchange imbalances on the bal-
ance sheets of banks and other financial institutions. 241
The second set of arrangements for the provision of FCLA
are two emergency lending facilities recently introduced by
the IMF. Established in 1945, the IMF is an international re-
serve fund originally designed to provide short-term loans to
assist member countries facing actual or potential balance of
241 FARHI ET AL., supra note 195, at 48.
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payments problems. 2 42 IMF member countries are required to
make contributions to the fund based on a quota formula that
takes into account each country's gross domestic product
("GDP"), the openness and variability of its economy, and ac-
cumulated foreign exchange reserves. 243 The IMF then uses
these funds to make loans to member countries under various
lending facilities. 24 4 The IMF also conducts surveillance of the
international monetary system, along with the fiscal, mone-
tary, and financial sector policies of each of its 189 member
countries. 24 5 Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed
exchange rate regime in the early 1970s, the IMF has at-
tempted to reinvent itself as an international financial crisis
"firefighter."246 Perhaps most notably, the IMF has played an
important role in coordinating the international response to
the emerging market debt crisis of the early 1980S 24 7, the
242 For an overview of the IMF's role, see The IMF at a Glance, IMF
(Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/IMF-at-a-Glance
[perma.cc/DH9D-ETRB]. For a more detailed description of its activities, see
Annual Report of the Executive Board, IMF, http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/pubs/ft/ar/index.htm [perma.cc/8CU5-WXEV].
243 For further details, see Report of the Executive Board to the Board
of Governors on the Reform of Quota and Voice in the International Monetary
Fund, IMF (Mar. 28, 2008), https://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/pp/eng/2008/032108.pdf [perma.cc/Q8SY-S67T].
244 For a complete list of IMF lending facilities, see IMF Lending, IMF
(Oct. 11, 2017), http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/IMF-Lending
[perma.cc/8FM7-8RFH].
245 Alongside this surveillance, the IMF also provides technical assis-
tance to member countries in relation to various aspects of economic policy.
Id. For a useful description of the IMF's role within the broader context of
the global financial and regulatory architecture, see generally Chris Brum-
mer, How International Financial Law Works (And How It Doesn't), 99 GEO.
L.J. 257 (2011).
246 See Wanted: Chief Firefighter, THE EcONOMIsT (June 2, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/18772058 [perma.ce/5GYY-SBXF].
247 See James M. Boughton, From Suez to Tequila: The IMF as Crisis
Manager 17-18 (IMF, Working Paper No. 97/90, 1997),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9790.pdf [perma.cc/9NQL-
KLBB].
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Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998248 and, more recently, the
rescues of Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Cyprus during the
European sovereign debt crisis. 249
Historically, the IMF has not been an important source of
FCLA. However, spurred by the global financial crisis, the
IMF has recently introduced two new emergency lending fa-
cilities: the Flexible Credit Line (the "FCL") and the Precau-
tionary and Liquidity Line (the "PLL").250 Introduced in
March 2009, the FCL is designed to provide emergency liquid-
ity assistance to member countries exhibiting strong economic
fundamentals and policy frameworks.251 A member country's
access to the FCL is subject to certain ex ante qualifications
based on its external and capital account position, access to
international sovereign debt markets, the health of its public
finances, the effectiveness of financial sector supervision, and
other factors. 252 Once qualified, member countries are entitled
248 See IMF, RECOVERY FROM THE ASIAN CRISIS AND THE ROLE OF THE
IMF (2000).
249 For a summary of the IMF's recent activities in Europe, see The IMF
and Europe, IMF (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.imf.org/exter-
nallnp/exr/facts/europe.htm [perma.cc/6EJD-2RGQ].
250 The FCL and PLL are not the IMF's first attempt to introduce emer-
gency liquidity facilities. Previous (failed) attempts have included the Con-
tingent Credit Line (launched in 1999) and the Short-Term Liquidity Facil-
ity (launched in 2008). For a summary of the development of, and debates
surrounding, these earlier initiatives, see generally Roberto Marino & Ul-
rich Volz, A Critical Review of the IMF's Tools for Crisis Prevention (Ger.
Dev. Inst., Paper No. 4/2012, 2012). The IMF has also recently introduced
the Rapid Financing Instrument ("RFI") for member countries facing urgent
balance of payment problems; see The IMF's Rapid Financing Instrument
(RFI), IMF (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.imf.org/en/About/Fact-
sheets/Sheets/2016/08/02/19/55[Rapid-Financing-Instrument
[perma.cc/Y6ZX-AZP6]. However, RFI loans are capped at 37.5% of a mem-
ber country's quota on an annual basis and 75% on a cumulative basis. RFI
loans are also subject to same terms as the FCL and PLL. Id.
251 See The IMF's Flexible Credit Line (FCL), IMF (Oct. 5, 2017),
http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/20/40/Flexible-
Credit-Line [perma.cc/89MW-6U8P].
252 Id. At the same time, the IMF has signaled that member countries
do not need to show strong performance against all these criteria. See IMF,
THE FLEXIBLE CREDIT LINE-GUIDANCE ON OPERATIONAL ISSUES (2009),
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to draw on the FCL at any time during the term of the facility
without the need to satisfy further conditions. The amount
that member countries can borrow is theoretically unlimited,
but ultimately subject to the general constraints on the IMF's
financial resources. Member countries that qualify for access
to the FCL must pay a commitment fee and, when drawn
upon, an interest rate that varies with the amount borrowed
and the time that borrowed funds remain outstanding. 253 To
date, the only countries that have applied for access to the
FCL are Mexico, Poland, and Colombia-with none of these
countries having thus far drawn down under this new facility.
Introduced in November 2011, the PLL is designed to pro-
vide emergency liquidity assistance to member countries that
do not meet the ex ante qualifications for access to the FCL.254
In addition to meeting a less stringent set of qualifications,
member countries borrowing under the PLL are subject to ex
post conditions reflecting the IMF's assessment of their poten-
tial vulnerabilities. 255 Compliance with these conditions is
then monitored and assessed by the IMF Executive Board on
a semi-annual basis. Once qualified, member countries can
borrow up to 250% of their quota per year, depending on the
duration of the loan and the source and severity of the eco-
nomic shock precipitating the need for emergency liquidity as-
sistance. 256 Qualified countries must pay a commitment fee,
plus interest and service charges on any drawn amounts. 257
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/110209.pdf [perma.cc/35CV-
KXX3].
253 Drawn amounts are also subject to a service charge of fifty basis
points. For a more detailed description of the methodology for calculating
the commitment fee, interest rate, and service charge, see The IMF's Flexi-
ble Credit Line (FCL), supra note 251.
254 The PLL replaced the Precautionary Credit Line introduced in Au-
gust 2010. See The IMF's Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), IMF (Oct.
10, 2017), http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/
01/20/45/Precautionary-and-Liquidity-Line [perma.cc/K9QK-5FP2].
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
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To date, the only countries to have applied for access to the
PLL are Macedonia and Morocco. 258
While still essentially untested, the FCL and PLL repre-
sent an important step in the development of a credible mul-
tilateral mechanism for the provision of FCLA. Perhaps most
importantly, the design of these facilities reflects a discerna-
ble shift in the IMF's focus from financial crisis firefighting
toward meaningful fire prevention. This shift is most clearly
reflected in the FCL's utilization of ex ante qualifications as
opposed to ex post conditionality. The use of ex ante qualifica-
tions injects a degree of certainty from the perspective of po-
tential creditor countries that they will have immediate and
unconditional access to the facility in the event of an emer-
gency. The absence of expost conditionality also eliminates an
important source of potential procedural obstacles to the rapid
extension of FCLA.
While the introduction of these facilities is undoubtedly a
positive development, the FCL and PLL are still a far cry from
representing a truly credible framework for the provision of
FCLA. First, only five countries-together representing less
than 3% of global GDP-have thus far applied for access to
these facilities. 259 Second, unlike conventional ELA facilities,
any loans ultimately extended under the FCL and PLL will
not be collateralized against the assets of either the borrowing
countries or the financial institutions that ultimately receive
FCLA. This is likely to exacerbate potential moral hazard
problems and leaves the IMF member countries that provide
financing under these facilities exposed to potentially signifi-
cant losses in the event of default.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the financial re-
sources currently available under the FCL and PLL may
simply be too small to mount an effective full-scale response
to a systemic foreign currency liquidity crisis. As of March
2017, IMF quotas totaled approximately $USD645 billion. 260
258 Id.
259 See The IMF's Flexible Credit Line (FCL), supra note 251; The IMF's
Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), supra note 254.
260 See The IMF at a Glance, supra note 242.
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Subject to the approval of member countries representing at
least 85% of the fund's resources, the IMF can also borrow up
to $USD250 billion from member countries under an existing
multilateral facility known as the 'New Arrangements to Bor-
row' (the "NAB"). However, with 17.47% of the IMF's total
quota (and 16.54% of the voting rights of the Board of Gover-
nors), this threshold notably gives the United States a de facto
veto over the use of the NAB.261 Furthermore, it is not clear
whether any countries other than the United States would be
in a position to lend the IMF U.S. dollars in the middle of a
global liquidity crisis. After subtracting current commitments
of approximately $USD159 billion, a conservative estimate
thus leaves the IMF with just over $USD500 billion of dry
powder theoretically available in response to an emerging
global crisis. Yet only a small fraction of this $USD500 bil-
lion-approximately $USD102.6 billion as of January 31,
2017-is comprised of the U.S dollars that are likely to be
most in demand in the thick of any such crisis.26 2 By way of
comparison, it worth remembering that U.S. dollar lending
under the swap lines between the Federal Reserve and other
major central banks peaked at $USD586 billion in December
2008. By almost any measure, the IMF is thus not in a position
to comply with the imperative of Bagehot's dictum to lend
freely in response to widespread panic and financial instabil-
ity.
261 When the requisite 85% supermajority does not approve a proposal
to activate the NAB, the IMF can still borrow under the 'General Agree-
ments to Borrow' ("GAB"). As of April 2017, the IMF was entitled to borrow
up to approximately $USD23 billion under the GAB. IMF Standing Borrow-
ing Arrangements, IMF (Apr. 2017), http://www.imf.org/en/About/Fact-
sheets/Sheets/2016/08/05/17/55/IMF-Standing-Borrowing-Arrangements
[perma.cc/YY4F-QLRW].
262 Figure calculated on the basis of the U.S. total of the IMF's currency
holdings (75,480.9 million SDR) multiplied by the notional SDR-USD ex-
change rate as of January 31, 2017 (1.358830). See IMF, FINANCIAL STATE-
MENTS FOR THE QUARTERS ENDED JANUARY 31, 2017, AND 2016 (2017),
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/quart/2017fy/013117.pdf
[perma.cc/PEM4-SRMX]; Currency Units per SDR for January 2017, IMF,
https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms-mth.aspx?SelectDate=2017-
01-31&reportType=CVSDR [perma.cc/ETY9-JHQ2].
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Given these resource constraints, Emmanuel Farhi,
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, and H616ne Rey propose granting
the IMF the right to borrow from national treasuries and cen-
tral banks and to raise capital on international bond mar-
kets.2 6 3 In order to address the moral hazard problems asso-
ciated with the FCL's use of ex ante qualifications (and the
absence of expost conditionality), they also propose subjecting
borrowers to ongoing monitoring of private sector foreign ex-
change imbalances over the term of any loan. Both of these
proposals seem prudent. Ultimately, however, the effective-
ness of these proposals hinges on the IMF using its new pow-
ers proactively to raise capital under normal market condi-
tions rather than waiting for a global liquidity crisis to appear
on the horizon. 264 Moreover, as Farhi, Gourinchas, and Rey
concede, these reforms would likely need to be considered as a
part of a far broader discussion regarding the governance of
the IMF.265 At least for the moment, this discussion does not
appear to be high on the IMF's agenda. In the absence of an
external catalyst, the FCL and PLL are thus likely to remain
incomplete and imperfect arrangements for the provision of
FCLA.
Are the proposed reforms to either the central bank swap
lines or the IMF's new emergency lending facilities feasible in
the current political climate? Perhaps not. Indeed, engender-
ing widespread political support for these reforms may prove
especially challenging precisely because they envision the
widening and deepening of the international financial safety
net. Nevertheless, the vagaries of domestic and international
politics do not detract from the reality that there are no free
lunches in global finance, and that the drive for deeper eco-
nomic and financial integration will eventually need to be
matched by more credible and effective commitments in the
realm of international financial policy, regulation, and crisis
263 FARHI ET AL., supra note 195, at 41.
264 By definition, raising capital in these circumstances would be more
expensive or, potentially, impossible. See supra Section III.B.
265 FARHI ET AL., supra note 195, at 43.
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management. Until they are prepared to make these commit-
ments, policymakers will continue to face a choice between au-
tarky and the instability generated by foreign currency liquid-
ity crises.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are a great many lessons from the global financial
crisis. This Article has identified some of the key lessons from
an extremely important but relatively unexamined episode
from the crisis: the international U.S. dollar liquidity shortage
that began in December 2007 and reached its apex in Septem-
ber and October 2008. Two lessons stand out. The first is that
the widespread issuance of short-term foreign currency liabil-
ities by banks and other financial institutions should be
viewed as a form of private money creation that poses a grave
threat to financial stability. The second is that, within a glob-
ally integrated financial and economic system, there are sig-
nificant practical constraints on the ability of sovereign states
to effectively respond to this threat.
It is perhaps tempting to view the network of central bank
swap lines established during the financial crisis, along with
the IMF's new emergency lending facilities, as evidence that
society has learned the important lessons from this episode.
However, while there is little doubt that the swap lines played
a critical role in stabilizing the financial system at the height
of the crisis, their current design gives rise to significant dis-
tortions, thereby undermining their likely effectiveness as a
comprehensive and durable solution to foreign currency li-
quidity problems. The new IMF emergency lending facilities,
meanwhile, though undoubtedly a constructive step toward a
viable multilateral facility for the provision of FCLA, are also
far from perfect and remain essentially untested.
This Article has sketched out a blueprint for how one might
improve the effectiveness of this emerging international ar-
chitecture for the provision of FCLA. This blueprint hinges on
strengthening the credibility of the commitments underpin-
ning FCLA, eliminating the distortions associated with the
underpriced provision of liquidity insurance under the current
facilities, and enhancing cross-border data sharing and
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macroprudential surveillance arrangements. While largely in-
cremental, these reforms could serve to dramatically reduce
the prospect of widespread financial instability stemming
from foreign currency liquidity problems.
Lastly, this Article has raised a host of important and-at
least for the moment-unanswered questions. Paramount
amongst these questions is how well the current patchwork
architecture for the provision of FCLA will perform during the
next global financial crisis. While there is reason for cautious
optimism, there is also enormous scope for political interfer-
ence, coordination problems, and policy failure. From an em-
pirical perspective, other important questions include
whether and how the current architecture might serve to dis-
tort international capital flows, along with how these distor-
tions might contribute to foreign exchange imbalances or fo-
ment potential financial instability. From a policy perspective,
important questions then include whether these distortions
are best addressed through the development of bilateral ar-
rangements such as central bank swap lines or multilateral
arrangements such as the IMF's emergency lending facilities.
The answers to these questions remain to be explored in sub-
sequent work and, ultimately, will play an important role in
building a more sustainable international financial system.
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